19–21 August 1933 — Resolution of the Plenum of the International Left Opposition (Ligue communiste internationaliste)
The events that took place in Germany, which led to the establishment of fascism and the collapse of the German Communist Party, posed before the International Left Opposition the question of the new party in Germany — a question which, after being extensively discussed within our ranks, has now been definitively settled.
On the basis of the events in Germany, the May Plenum unanimously adopted the orientation toward building a genuine Communist Party in Germany. Even before this, since the betrayal committed in Germany by the Stalinist party, voices had been raised within our ranks calling for a new international orientation. "How can one condemn the German party without at the same time condemning the Communist International, which directed the party and which is the real party responsible for this betrayal?" was the customary argument of these comrades. The events in Austria and Bulgaria, the observation that neither the International nor its parties were capable of drawing the slightest lesson from the German catastrophe but, on the contrary, actively set to work to justify the disastrous policy pursued in Germany and even presented the present situation as a victory — these facts broadened the criticism directed at the true party responsible for the German betrayal, and compelled us to pose the question of our attitude toward the International and to settle it clearly and definitively.
Should we continue to regard ourselves as a fraction of the CI, or break with it definitively, separating our responsibility from the policy of the fraction that directs the International? Should we persevere in the orientation toward reform, or put an end to it and orient ourselves toward a new, independent regroupment of revolutionary forces on an international scale?
The International Secretariat has already set out for the sections, in its circular, how the question was posed. Although discussion is still only in its early stages in the sections, it appears that the proposal for the new orientation has been favourably received. It is necessary that this turn, of historic importance, be preceded by ample discussion in order to clarify as fully as possible all the questions bound up with it and to bring out the tasks that flow from it.
It is now a matter of drawing up the balance sheet of what our position as a fraction vis-à-vis the CI has given us, and of establishing our position in the light of the experience gained from the German catastrophe up to the present day. The CI's departure from the line of its first congresses took place by stages, among the most notable of which were the policy of the Anglo-Russian Committee, the defeat of the Chinese revolution, the gradual degeneration of the Russian Communist Party, and the treacherous capitulation before German fascism.
This process of degeneration finds its expression in the international communist movement in the form of an ideological and organizational weakening of the parties. Although this whole degeneration was determined principally by the establishment of the reactionary theory of "socialism in one country", it nevertheless took place by stages, between which one can observe differing degrees of decomposition.
Our position as a fraction was determined by the reality out of which we arose, and within which we were obliged to work. The proletarian character of the Soviet state; the existence of a party with the greatest traditions and of an international organization embracing important revolutionary forces — these constituted forces on which we had to count for an entire period, for the possibility of the reform we advocated. It was necessary to exhaust all the possibilities flowing from this reality before raising the question of a new orientation. That was an indispensable stage under these concrete conditions, an inevitable experience we had to undergo, and on the basis of which we were bound, at a certain decisive stage, to determine our position.
Is reform possible after the German experience, and particularly after the lessons of these last months? And if it is no longer possible, what purpose does it serve to remain a fraction? Must we fatally wait for the same experience to be repeated in every country, or for the catastrophe of Soviet Russia, before abandoning the position of a fraction? Or, as the vanguard of the revolutionary movement, must we from now on separate out our responsibilities, acknowledge reality, and engage in the path of an independent regroupment of revolutionary forces on an international scale, in order to wage the harshest and most effective struggle against world capitalism and thereby provide genuine support to the proletarian state?
These are the questions we must answer. The force of the facts imposes on us a new orientation. This means that, from now on, we must consider every possibility of rapprochement and collaboration with the revolutionary forces which, after the German catastrophe, are beginning to break away from the influence of the Communist International, directed by the Stalinists, and from the Second International, and to orient themselves toward a communist movement founded on the principles formulated by the first congresses of the CI and on the experience acquired in the communist movement since the death of Lenin. This means that, while separating our responsibility from that of the Stalinists, we must collaborate with the Stalinist organizations on the international, national and local scale, on the basis of united-front tactics, by means of which we must bind to ourselves and win over the best elements still remaining in the Stalinist parties. Even at the present stage of the CI's decomposition, winning over these elements will constitute an important objective of our activity.
The lessons of the recent events following the German catastrophe have quite logically brought out our change of viewpoint on an international scale. These lessons have also freed us from our former attitude toward the Stalinist party in the Soviet Union.
The question of our attitude toward the Communist Party of the USSR must be considered in connection with the question of our attitude toward the Communist International. On the one hand, our independent activity in the capitalist countries, through the regroupment of revolutionary forces on the basis of genuine communist principles, will forge the most effective weapon for the defence of the proletarian state; and on the other hand, our bold attitude within the Soviet Union will throw into sharper relief the state of decomposition of the Stalinist party, will awaken the attention of all elements devoted to the communist cause by showing them the enormous danger threatening the proletarian state, and will give them a banner with which to fight reaction and drive the centrist bureaucracy from power.
The Plenum, in adopting this new orientation in its general lines, underlines the heavy tasks that fall to our international organization in the coming period. More than ever, there is an especially pressing need for close cohesion in our ranks, for absolute clarity in our positions and principles, and for a deployment of activity in every field of action among the working and oppressed strata.
These premises will enable us to apply a flexible tactic toward all currents orienting themselves toward communism and, on the basis of firm principles, to facilitate their assimilation of these principles and their definitive passage into the common camp of the intransigent and merciless struggle for the overthrow of capitalism.
How is this new International to be built? Rooting our own strength within the ranks of the workers.
1. Regard ourselves as the embryo of the genuine Communist Party; establish in each section our very broad programme of action; resolutely turn our backs on reform work and its particular features; maintain fractions within all workers' organizations, and adjust our tactics according to the relationship of forces.
Direct our fire principally against the influence of social democracy; be the propagandists, the popularizers of communism and internationalism; strive to wrest the workers attached to the [Communist] party away from it through real action against the bourgeoisie and its lackeys. To this end, practise the united front in action with the official CP at every level. Should the bureaucracy refuse, support the actions of the Stalinist parties when they are correct; combat them when they are mistaken.
2. With regard to auxiliary organizations — International Red Aid, etc. — draw the consequences of our new orientation consistently. Wherever the IRA proves itself to be nothing but an instrument of bureaucratic and factional self-preservation, create, to the extent of our strength, genuine organizations of revolutionary solidarity. What is said here applies equally to all the party's other auxiliary organizations.
3. Declare that our previous analysis of the Soviet state, as a workers' state undergoing accentuated bureaucratic degeneration, remains our own; that the intensification of bureaucratic degeneration within the CPSU and the CI implies a decisive danger for the workers' state; that the reconstitution of a party in the USSR, and the strengthening of the revolutionary proletariat throughout the world around a revolutionary International, are decisive factors in the defence of the workers' state.
Rally the revolutionary forces of the world by denouncing the incapacity of the Stalinist parties to defend the USSR. Struggle within the USSR for the reform of the state, for the complete restoration of the prerogatives of the proletariat, for the defeat of the bureaucracy. Support the proletarian forces at every moment against the Thermidorian forces; such will be the role, within the USSR, of our section, whose indispensable creation, as the embodiment of communist and revolutionary principles, will be the greatest guarantee for the survival of the October revolution. This demand in no way implies that we are prepared to countenance the creation of other parties in the USSR. On this point the Left Opposition has nothing to change in its demand for workers' democracy as the pivot of the dictatorship of the proletariat.
4. Our present forces, acting as the embryo of a Communist Party, can, through their political cohesion, their testing in activity among the organizations of the working class, and the experience that results from it, exert a considerable attraction upon the other currents of the workers' movement — currents rejected by the Third or the Second International — which are orienting themselves toward communist positions. Our power of attraction will be all the greater in that the screen of our position as a fraction will no longer stand between these currents and ourselves.
These formations are numerous; some are close to our position, others are still heterogeneous and require prolonged, patient work for their assimilation to our positions. The conception of an unprincipled rallying-together must be combated vigorously. On the contrary, the International Left Opposition must direct its forces toward assembling these scattered currents on the basis of the communist principle.
This cannot be a matter of a rallying-together between the Third and the Second International, but rather one on the basis of the Third International as abandoned by the CI (the first four congresses in their broad outlines, enriched by the experience of the last ten years) and the eleven points of the ILO's pre-conference.
5. The basis of political relations with existing groups having thus been defined, the Left Opposition must understand the historic interest represented by the international regroupment of these currently scattered groups, which, lacking well-defined principled foundations and organic ties, may in the present chaos degenerate or be delivered up to the exterminating manoeuvres of the Stalinists.
On the other hand, the ILO must equally understand that the crumbling of the Second and Third Internationals will continue to give rise to further scatterings, and that in its relations with groups moving toward communism it must display as much pedagogical flexibility as political intransigence.
Resolution of the Plenum of 19–21 August 1933, in La Vérité, no. 170, 1 September 1933.