Revolution on the March

1. The revolutionary overthrow of the Somoza dictatorship in July 1979 opened the road of socialist revolution in Central America. It was the most serious blow to American imperialism in Latin America since the upsurge of the Cuban revolution in 1959.

The Pentagon considers the entire area contained within a radius starting from Florida, going through the Caribbean, Cuba (with the Guantánamo base), Puerto Rico, Haiti, Dominican Republic, Central America including Nicaragua, and ending at the southern tip of the Panama Canal, as a special preserve.

After the victory of the Cuban revolution, moreover, American imperialism tightened its grip over this region, especially in Central America. The military dictatorships were more and more closely integrated on the military and political plane, into the counterrevolutionary imperialist system. In 1961, the invaders of Cuba, who suffered a stinging defeat at the Bay of Pigs, started out from Somoza's Nicaragua. The anti-Cuban press campaign was then organized by the Inter-american Press Association, whose vice president was none other than Pedro Joaquín Chamorro, leader of the bourgeois opposition to Somoza.

The revolution broke out in Nicaragua at a time when the crisis of the dictatorial regimes was intensifying in Central America, especially in El Salvador.

The victory of the Nicaraguan masses, led by the Sand in ist National Liberation Front (FSLN), over the Somoza regime has a great power of attraction for the workers, peasants, and revolutionists throughout Latin America. The wi ping out of the Somozaist regime is part of a new upsurge of activity by the working masses on the continent, as shown by the working-class and mass mobilizations of 1977 in Colombia, the working-class upsurge in Brazil in 1978 and 1979, the general strike and political radicalization expressed in the vote received by the FOCEP slate in the 1978 elections in Peru, the struggles and general strike in Bolivia in 1979, the intensification of the working-class resistance in Argentina, the uprising of the people of Grenada in 1979.

The imperialist strategists and politicians will do everything possible to contain and crush the revolution on the march in Nicaragua.

2. The death agony of Somozaism was extended for nearly two years. Beginning in September 1977, guerrilla actions, strikes, demonstrations, and urban uprisings progressively multiplied and culminated in a popular insurrection extending over one-and-a-half months.

This activity of the mass movement, its degree of organization, and its goals, bore witness to its tendency to assert its independent role and not subordinate itself to the class needs of the opposition bourgeoisie. The latter focused all its energy on finding a negotiated solution to the crisis of Somozaism, in order to ensure beyond a few changes—the continuity of the state structures, above all the National Guard (GN).

The Somozaist state was largely the creation of American imperialism. Militarily present in Nicaragua since 1911, the United States in 1933 placed Anastasio Somoza García at the head of the GN. In 1936, through a power play ratified by phony elections, he became president.

The origin of Somozaism as a regime imposed and backed to the hilt by the United States, was an important factor in the combining of the anti dictatorial and anti-imperialist struggles that took place immediately in any opposition movement having sufficient breadth.

In an attempt to strengthen its legitimacy, the dictatorship conceded the right of existence to a bourgeois opposition party, the Conservative Party. The strict control over the state apparatus, the GN and the Liberal Party by the Somoza family gave this two-party system its real content. The dictatorship had to resort to rigged elections (1957 and 1967), constitutional maneuvers (1953), a state of siege (1974-77) and fierce repression to try to respond to the festering crisis of its system of domination.

The opposition bourgeoisie gained a stronger economic position during the 1960s. It benefited from the process of economic integration of Central America (the Central American Common Market) that favored the development of agro-exporting and industrial sectors. Whole bourgeois groups broadened their bases in industry, agribusiness, and banking. They opposed the Somoza family and its allies who acted as "disloyal" competitors. However, they needed the regime's armed might to ensure the general conditions for superexploitation of the workers and agricultural laborers and to counteract the military offensives of the FSLN.

The state of siege instituted in December 1974, after the capture by the FSLN of many of the regime's dignitaries, intensified the inter bourgeois crisis, already stimulated by the dictatorship's inability to respond to the problems created by the terrible earthquake in 1972 and by the many swindles that the dictator engaged in at that time. The state of siege enabled the bourgeoisie as a whole to break the strike wave (in the building and hospitals sectors in 1973-74). In this way, it was useful to the bourgeoisie, enabling it to carry out the structural transformations made necessary by the international capitalist recession. But emergency laws and military tribunals were exploited in a unilateral way by the Somozaist clique to monopolize speculatory operations and get their hands on the most profitable deals. This far too unequal game could not continue in a climate of more and more open economic crisis.

No oppositionist could be considered safe from a repression whose ferocity stripped the regime of any element of legitimacy, while at the same time legitimizing the use of armed struggle by the masses as a component of political action. The opposition bourgeoisie had to take its distances more clearly and call for the departure of the dictator. In September 1977, the Somozaist regime was politically isolated on the national level, and its decline on the international level was accelerating.

3. From the end of 1977 to the end of 1978, the different factions of the opposition bourgeoisie sought in vain to take the leadership of the mass movement, while multiplying the initiatives aimed at obtaining the departure of Somoza and those close to him.

On January 10, 1978, the assassination by the Somozaists of Pedro Joaquín Chamorro Card en al, owner of the big daily La Prensa, unleashed a cumulative process. The opposition bourgeoisie and imperialism were deprived of an alternative leadership to Somoza having a following among broad layers of the petty bourgeoisie and even among the popular masses. Chamorro, since 1974, had united significant sectors of the bourgeoisie within the Democratic Union for Liberation (UDEL). As the head of La Prensa, he had forged a reputation as a resolute oppositionist. His disappearance intensified the inter bourgeois crisis and made the containment of the mass movement a more awkward matter.

On January 24, the UDEL issued a call for an "employers' strike," which paralyzed a big part of the economy. Under this pressure, the Conservative Party broke the pact with the Liberal Party. Despite the repression, street demonstrations developed in Matagalpa and Managua, where the FSLN's political presence was strong. The armed actions of the FSLN took on a new dimension at the beginning of February, with the attack on the National Guard barracks in the cities of Granada and Rivas.

When the UDEL suspended the "employers' strike" on February 6, the attempt by the trade-union leaderships to turn it into a strike by workers failed. This revealed the relationship of forces that shaped the opposition movement at that stage. But two weeks later, the popular uprisings of Monimbó (a district of Ma sa ya) and Subtiava (a district of León) already fore shadow ed the insurrectional dynamic that characterized the final phase of the struggle against the dictatorship. The prerevolutionary crisis was intensifying.

Under the spur of the activity of the masses and the growing prestige of the FSLN, the opposition bourgeoisie reorganized its forces and sought again to negotiate the dictator's departure. In July 1978, the Broad Opposition Front (FAO), which included, among others, the Nicaraguan Democratic Movement (MDN) of Alfonso Robelo Callejas, the UDEL, and the Group of Twelve (figures connected with industry, commerce, and the liberal professions) was created. The Group of Twelve had ties with a current in the FSLN, the "tercer is ta" tendency. It saw armed struggle as the su rest way of forcing Somoza out, and favored the setting up of a government including the FSLN. The two factions of the Nicaraguan Socialist Party (PSN), a Stalinist party, also participated in the FAO. The Catholic church also came out openly in favor of Somoza's resignation.

But the resistance by Somoza—who made use of the relative autonomy he enjoyed as a result of several decades of domination over the state apparatus, the army, and a part of the country's economy—put the bourgeois opposition in a difficult position. This was especially true inasmuch as the FSLN's armed actions—especially the spectacular occupation of the National Palace on August 22-24 which ended in the release of the FSLN prisoners—made it, in the eyes of the masses, the only pole clearly situated outside the negotiations for the succession to the regime and determined to have a showdown with Somoza.

The FAO, with its back to the wall, issued a new call for the shutdown of all economic activity on August 25. The industrialists' association—in contrast to the protest strike in March called by the UDEL—went along with the movement. Its consequences were threefold: the economic crisis deepened and the workers were the first ones to pay for it, which intensified the class division within the anti-Somoza front; the mass movement displayed growing independence from the bourgeois leadership in comparison with the "bosses' strike" in January; with this momentum, the FSLN launched its military offensive of September 9 in the cities of León, Estelí, Ma sa ya, Chinandega, and others, where popular uprisings culminated in a take over of those are as by the population.

The counterattack by the GN was sharp and brutal; its military victory was confirmed by the end of September. It launched a real massacre against the youth and all who were suspected of sympathy for the Sandinistas. But the FSLN forces were not liquidated. They swelled under the influx of hundreds of youth who joined their fight to escape the repression and to avenge those who had fallen. The mass insurrection combined with armed struggle appeared to all currents of the FSLN and to broad sectors of the masses as the road to follow to get rid of the tyranny.

Somoza had won a military battle, but politically, he came out of it weakened and very isolated on the international level. The opposition bourgeoisie tried to use this weakness, as well as the temporary retreat of the masses, to again engage in a final negotiation to establish what the FSLN described as "Somozaism without Somoza."

Under the aegis of a mediation panel on which the United States was flanked by Guatemala and the Dominican Republic—the FAO began the "dialogue" with the dictatorship.

The direct intervention of American imperialism in these negotiations in October 1978 led the "tercer is ta" tendency of the FSLN to take the step of rejecting mediation and breaking its ties with the FAO. It was followed by the Group of Twelve. This narrow ed the FAO's negotiating capacity. The "dialogue" with the dictatorship failed in mid-January 1979, despite the numerous concessions made by the FAO.

A new stage in the organization of the anti-Somoza front opened after this break. The National Patriotic Front (FPN) was formed. The bourgeois leadership of the anti-Somoza front lost ground. United within the FPN were some minor bourgeois formations, the Group of Twelve, the United People's Movement (MPU), which encompassed various mass organizations, often influenced by the FSLN, and, significantly, the trade-union federations. On January 10, 1979, the first anniversary of the Chamorro assassination, tens of thousands of demonstrators took to the streets of Managua at the call of the FPN. In the afternoon, the workers went out on strike until the end of the day.

Three changes underlay this new phase of the struggle: first, the FPN's goals more directly took up the demands of the popular masses who were hit by the crisis and for the first time demanded expropriation of the Somoza clique's assets, as well as the dissolution of the National Guard; second, the political organization of the mass movement by the FSLN was consolidated with the formation of the MPU, and thus prepared the way for the organization of popular committees; third, the convergence between the different tendencies in the FSLN was made easier after the break by the "tercer ist as" with the FAO. The movement against Somoza again combined in an inseparable way the anti dictatorial and anti-imperialist fight. The conditions for generalized insurrection were ripening.

4. The revolutionary overthrow of the Somoza regime by a general strike that was transformed into an insurrection in the country's main cities was prepared for and preceded by an overall military offensive launched by the FSLN.

The social forces that supported and participated in this heroic battle against imperialism and the dictatorship were concentrated in the semiproletarianized masses in the cities, the proletariat, the agricultural proletariat, the semiproletarianized and pauperized peasantry, and sections of the radicalized petty bourgeoisie (the student movement and women's movement, organized in AMPRONAC—Association of Women Concerned With the National Problem). A big part of these forces were represented and organized in the organizations that were grouped under the emblem of the MPU.

The penetration of imperialist and local capital into the countryside during the last two decades, and the growth of an agribusiness sector—based on the raising and exportation of cotton, coffee, sugar, and meat—had a twofold consequence: on the one hand, the expulsion of impoverished peasants from the countryside; on the other hand, the broadening of the ranks of the agricultural proletariat employed on the big modernized estates.

Industrial development was tied to agricultural exports (canning, food industries), to industries aimed at the Central American Common Market (textiles, pesticides, fertilizers, food), and to a new wave of imperialist investments (assembly or finishing plants, including the "free economic zone" in Managua, where 85 percent of the secondary activities were concentrated). The industrial proletariat, therefore, had been consolidated during the last few years, even if it remained relatively weak. The workers in the building industry (a sector that was heavily developed immediately after the 1972 earthquake) and in transportation represented a force of about 75,000 persons out of an economically active population bordering on 700,000 in 1978.

The urban population grew by 50 percent between 1970 and 1978. In that year, it ове to 1,265,000 persons, out of a total of 2,400,000. This reflected not only the growth of the proletariat, but also of the semi proletariat, under employed or unemployed masses who clustered around the main cities. The central role of urban insurrections in the battle was directly related to these changes in the social structure.

The agricultural proletariat counted in its ranks about 300,000 workers, the major part of whom were in cotton-raising. It was subjected to temporary work in its great majority. Women and children formed a big share of this labor force, which mig rated according to the rhythms imposed by the agricultural cycle. Ferociously exploited, these workers saw their meager wages taken back by their employers, who ran the shops where they bought necessities.

The degree of concentration of land ownership was very high: in 1972, 0.6 percent of the landowners—those owning 1,000 manzanas (670 hectares) or more monopolized 30.5 percent of the arable lands. Among these latifundists, the Somoza family occupied a chief place, owning 25 to 30 percent. At the other end of the spectrum, 50.8 percent of landowners, those owning less than 10 manzanas (6.7 hectares)—owned only 3.4 percent of the lands. Among them was a large section of very poor peasants, working their plots of land and forced to sell their labor power in order to survive. These figures also reveal the existence of a not insignificant intermediary layer of small peasants who were not as poor, and a layer of medium-sized landowners.

The economic crisis, which intensified after 1975, dealt a harsh blow to the working class, rural proletariat, and semiproletarianized small peasants, all of whom were already in a state of poverty that was one of the worst in Central America. The economic collapse in 1978-79, the disruption of the agricultural cycle as a result of the civil war, the devaluation of the cordoba by 43 percent in April 1979 which led to a burst of inflation—all of this made the life of the toiling masses unbearable. An ever greater number—close to 50 percent of the economically active population in mid-1979—was doomed to unemployment. The urban petty bourgeoisie was also hard hit. Added to this was the massive repression, which was the government's only instrument after the breakdown in negotiations with the FAO. With their backs to the wall, the masses saw the overthrow of the tyranny as the only way to survive. Social polarization became acute.

In Nicaragua, the working class, like the agricultural proletariat and pauperized peasantry, did not have as long a tradition of organized struggles as they had in Cuba or Guatemala, for example. Nevertheless, in 1973-74, the trade-union movement made significant gains. In 1977, the formation of the Association of Rural Workers (ATC) marked a step forward in the organization of that social layer.

In the last months preceding the fall of the regime, land occupations, general strikes, and urban uprisings, along with military attacks on the cities by the FSLN and the activities of its guerrilla columns, reflected the combined entry into a head-on struggle against Somoza of these exploited and oppressed social layers, which were and are the motor force of the Nicaraguan revolution.

The two years of open combat against the dictatorship acted as a powerful stimulant to the development of the masses' level of consciousness. The process of self-organization in the form of neighborhood committees or self-defense organs put a distinctive stamp on the last ten months of the struggle. It was a factor in the unleashing of the dynamic of permanent revolution.

Sandinism gave an ideological and political coherence to the fight against the dictatorship. The power of the Nicaraguan ruling classes was closely dependent on the wishes of American imperialism, and it appeared as such in the eyes of the masses. After the ouster of Santos Zelaya by the United States in 1909, no significant sector of the local oligarchy put up any resistance to American control. Thus, the military struggle of Augusto César Sandino against imperialism from 1927 to 1933 was identified with the struggle against the dictatorship installed by the "marines." The anti-imperialist struggle, anti dictatorship struggle, and armed struggle thus corresponded to a class division and encompassed the basic features of Sandinism, a revolutionary nationalism of petty-bourgeois origin, but with very deep roots among the masses.

5. The FSLN, at its founding in 1961 under the impact of the Cuban socialist revolution, was able to take hold of the tradition of this radical anti-imperialist movement for its struggle, which gave it a special profile in comparison with other armed struggle movements that arose at the same time. That is what explains its influence among the masses when they went into action.

In addition, the very origin of the dictatorship, the overwhelming role of the National Guard in the Somozaist apparatus, the regime's inability to broaden its social base and acquire legitimacy, and the impossibility for the petty bourgeoisie to find any niche whatsoever in this political system, created fertile ground for the FSLN's activity.

After the second half of the 1970s, all these factors came to the fore against a backdrop of economic crisis. This led in mid-1978 to the massive integration of young workers, poor peasants, agricultural workers, students and young unemployed into the FSLN's military actions. Women workers and students engaged in the battle in large numbers.

The division of the FSLN into three tendencies in 1975 (each of which had their own organization) revealed the sharpness of the debates over the forms of struggle against the dictatorship. However, their content reflected the maturing of the objective conditions favoring the fight to overthrow Somoza. These discussions centered on the relations between armed struggle and the mobilization of the masses, the respective role of the mobilization of the urban masses and those of the peasantry, the role and scope of the radicalization of sections of the petty bourgeoisie, the relations between military work and political work, and the function and importance of pacts with the opposition bourgeoisie.

Two tendencies claimed to be Marxist: the "prolonged people's war" tendency and the "proletarian (Marxist-Leninist)" tendency. The former, which based itself on the Chinese, but above all on the Vietnamese experience, anticipated a prolonged war of liberation that would be based on a heavy implantation in the rural are as and could thus deal decisive blows to the cities. The latter put the emphasis on urban work, particularly in the working-class neighborhoods, and on implantation in the workers movement, student movement, and women's movement, as preparation for an urban insurrection combined with armed actions by the FSLN. It had the most reservations about a policy of alliances with the bourgeoisie, and did not spare its criticisms of the third tendency, the "tercer ist as." The latter represented the largest force numerically. They were the most active in terms of military actions, and also the most involved in relations with sectors of the bourgeoisie within the FAO. A section of their leadership had ties with the international Social Democracy.

None of the three tendencies expressed a clear understanding of the dynamic of permanent revolution that would be opened by the revolutionary overthrow of the dictatorship. Whereas some advocated the necessity of limiting the goals of the struggle to the establishment of a "bourgeois democratic stage," others envision ed it simply as an intermediate passage on the road to the socialist revolution.

The political debate conducted by these tendencies favored the political maturing of the front as a whole.

An important transformation took place within the FSLN as a result of its unification in December 1978. According to the FSLN's joint declaration, it was intended to "guarantee that our people should not be dispossessed of their heroic struggle by the maneuvers of Yankee imperialism and sectors of the local bourgeoisie who are ready to sell out the fatherland."

As a result of the needs for organization stemming from the conduct of the civil war and popular insurrection, the structures of the former tendencies broke up, and the unification led to a fusion of the leading bodies of the former tendencies. The scope of the mass mobilizations, and the semispontaneous rise of committees and militias, stimulated the ideological evolution of the FSLN cadres leading this movement, whose impetuousness forced them to make continual readjustments. The collapse of the institutions of the Somozaist regime determined a revolutionary process that did not fit the pre established schemas of the "democratic stage." The FSLN also underwent a profound transformation that made the old lines of cleavage obsolete in part.

The heroic history of the FSLN's uncompromising fight, its leading role in the first phase of the revolution, its ties with living forces of the revolution, and the lessons that this pragmatic and heterogeneous leadership has already drawn from this powerful upsurge of the class struggle, testify to the FSLN cadres' potential for political development.

6. At the end of May 1979, the FSLN launched a new wave of military attacks. It opened up several fronts, which tended to disperse the forces of the National Guard and to weaken the control of the repressive apparatus over the cities.

On June 4, a general strike, this time called by the FSLN, paralyzed the entire country.

In the days that followed, insurrections broke out in the cities of Chinandega, León, Matagalpa, Estelí, Ma sa ya, Granada, and Carazo.

In fact, the FSLN leadership had been carefully preparing for this insurrection since March. The Civil Defense Committees (CDCs) launched a political campaign to prepare the masses for the insurrection. In this way, it was responding to one of the weaknesses noted by the FSLN in September 1978. The CDCs were to make it possible to integrate growing sectors of the masses into the organization of the insurrection. The CDCs were to collect the material necessary for building barricades as well as various munitions (Molotov cocktails, explosives), form surveillance groups in the neighborhoods, set up clandestine dispensaries and clinics and procure medicines for them, establish operating centers and secret printshops with minimal printing equipment, provide links with the FSLN units and furnish them with supplies, and inform the FSLN about the movements of the National Guard and the activities of Somoza's followers. Workers Defense Committees (CDTs) arose in the plants, which were to take control of factories having a strategic importance, help manufacture weapons, try to control the means of communication, and establish ties between the workers and the neighborhood residents. Committees also arose on the large plantations.

A spontaneous insurrectionary movement broke out on June 10 in the main working-class neighborhoods of Managua. "Liberated zones" arose in the capital. The National Guard had to concentrate bigger forces there, which facilitated the FSLN's military operations on the various fronts and the advance of its troops from the northern front toward the capital. The people of Managua, with the youth in the front ranks, withstood an eighteen-day siege—against the aircraft, artillery, and armored tanks of the National Guard. Their courage and determination enabled them to resist despite the weakness of their weaponry. On June 28, the FSLN organized an orderly retreat by 6,000 persons to Ma sa ya, a city twenty-eight kilometers away. This was an outstanding proof of the authority and prestige of the FSLN among the toiling population and the residents of the working-class neighborhoods, as well as their high degree of self-discipline.

On June 17, the Junta of the Nicaraguan Government of National Reconstruction (GRNN) was formed. This coalition government with sectors of the bourgeoisie essentially reflected the regroupment of forces that had taken place within the FPN. Its five members were Violeta de Chamorro, widow of Pedro Joaquín Chamorro (leader of the UDEL), Sergio Ramirez Mercado (a member of the Group of Twelve), Alfonso Robelo Callejas (industrialist and founder of the MDN), Daniel Ortega (representing the FSLN), and Moises Hassan (representing the MPU).

On June 24, the OAS declared its opposition to Somoza, whose isolation within the country was symbolized by his "bunker." Internationally, he got support only from the dictatorships in Chile, Uruguay, Argentina, Paraguay, Honduras, El Salvador, and Guatemala. Israel was deliver ing weapons to him. Imperialism took some distance from Somoza but only with reluctance and hesitation. To enable Somoza to ferociously attack the workers and peasants remained a constant element of their policy, representing a necessary preparation for a smooth transition to a new bourgeois regime.

The national bourgeoisies of Venezuela, Mexico, Costa Rica, and Panama—with the consent of American imperialism—did everything possible so that the conduct of the civil war should not break the continuity of the state institutions, and so that a sector of the National Guard should fuse with the FSLN. In this perspective, they recognized the GRNN.

The civil war and the drive toward insurrection had a profound impact on the organization of the masses and on the armed forces of the FSLN. Dual power took shape in Nicaragua.

In the liberated cities, the CDCs became organs of people's power. They substituted themselves for the administrative structures of the Somozaist regime, which had broken up. They carried out multiple tasks connected with the distribution of food rations, the organization of medical care, the maintenance of order, neutralization of the Somozaists, and elementary municipal administration.

Popular militias were formed in the course of the insurrection—they also appeared in a few rural areas—and strengthened the FSLN's military potential, although they had only handmade weapons. While they arose spontaneously as a result of the need to resist the counterattacks of the National Guard, they were generally office red by FSLN members and placed themselves under the command of the Front. They appeared under various emblems: Popular Action Committees (CA Ps), People's Revolutionary Commandos (CRPs), Revolutionary Youth Brigades (BRJs).

Finally, the FSLN's regular troops were strengthened.

On the northern and southern fronts, the FSLN forces more and more took on the features of a regular army, whose weaponry permitted a higher-level confrontation with the National Guard. The latter possessed a hard core of some 7,000 men, while forced recruitment since September 1978 had raised its number to 15,000. On the other hand, the FSLN troops, armed with light artillery weapons, were only about 5,000 men, to which were added the few thousand fighters, often very young, from the cities. The synchronization of the urban insurrections, the fierce resistance of the population of the working-class neighborhoods of Managua, and the coordinated attacks by the FSLN on several fronts, more and more confined the National Guard, whose morale was collapsing, to the strict task of defending its barracks and the "bunker."

Somoza's flight on July 17 opened the final phase of the overthrow of the regime. The Somozaist Francisco Urcuyo, a deputy in the Congress, was to transfer power to the Junta of the GRNN. But above all, he was to make possible—according to American plans—a transition that would ensure a role for the National Guard, or at least an important section of it, in the military organization of the new regime. His appeals to the combatants to lay down their arms, and his declared wish to remain in office until the close of the 1981 presidential elections, provoked a sharp response from the FSLN, and brought down the house of cards known as "change amid continuity."

The FSLN launched a new military offensive to drive out Urcuyo. The population of Managua again rose up massively. Militia fighters and residents of the working-class neighborhoods seized control of the "bunker" and distributed the tens of thousands of weapons that they found there. The National Guard went to pieces. A large part fled with weapons and baggage to Honduras, Guatemala, and El Salvador. The FSLN troops entered the capital and allowed the Junta of the GRNN to be established in Managua.

7. The FSLN inherited a devastated country. About 40,000 persons were killed during the civil war. The wounded numbered about 80,000. A part of the social infrastructure (schools, hospitals) was destroyed. The productive apparatus was heavily damaged and many enterprises had their activities disrupted. The agricultural production cycle was greatly hamper ed, which intensifies the shortage of food products. The shortage will further intensify during the first months of 1980; a million persons will have to be fed, 45 percent of whom are children under fifteen years old. Unemployment and underemployment were very high. They will further increase in January 1980, that is, at the end of the harvest period. The foreign debt of $1.5 billion is a crushing burden, while the Somozaists left practically nothing in the state coffers.

The various decrees adopted by the Junta of the GRNN, in the course of the first three months of its existence, show the direction of the process of permanent revolution unleashed by the victorious popular insurrection.

• The total assets of Somoza and the Somozaists were expropriated by July 20. They were located in sectors as diverse as the banks, industry, commerce, transportation, fishing, agriculture, real estate, harbor facilities, newspapers and the media.

• The banks and savings institutions were nationalized, and the operations of the imperialist banks are tightly controlled. This is a necessary first step in order to channel resources and direct them toward sectors such as education or hospitals, and institute economic planning measures. Nationalization of the insurance companies at the end of October further increased state control over the financial sector.

• On the monetary level, the withdrawal of 500- and 1,000 cordoba bills partially decapitalized the Somozaists, and dealt a blow to those whose speculative activities had benefited from the war period. All deposits no larger than 3,000 cordobas were returned. This measure also had an anti-inflationary function. At the end of October, this volume of currency began to be put into circulation.

• All of the mines, which essentially belonged to imperialist companies, were nationalized, which clearly reinforced the measures of control already taken over all of the country's natural resources.

• The bulk of overland transportation, as well as marine and air transportation, was nationalized.

• Television and a part of the radio stations were expropriated and serve as FSLN outlets. The printshop that used to publish Somoza's newspaper is now used to print Barricada, the FSLN daily.

• The agrarian reform was initiated with the state expropriation of the lands and estates belonging to the Somoza family, lands distributed by Somoza to his allies, pro per ties abandoned by their owner, plantations having debts to financial institutions which enjoyed special privileges thanks to direct support from Somoza, and lands whose owners are under indictment for tax evasion. This already represents about 40 percent of the cultivable lands.

These lands were confiscated and placed under the control of the Nicaraguan Institute for Agrarian Reform (INRA). The INRA set up state farms and cooperatives (associated units) that work the land but cannot subdivide it. In addition, the INRA is providing incentives for the formation of production and marketing cooperatives by the small peasants. Plots of land were distributed when small peasants requested them. However, the INRA is not in favor of the type of "agrarian reform" which is demanded by sectors of the bourgeoisie. In addition, the government abolished the expropriation of small peasants for nonpayment of debts.

• State enterprises were set up to sell basic agricultural products—cotton, coffee, sugar, meat, and fishing byproducts—on the domestic and foreign market. A state enterprise (ENABAS) was put in charge of marketing cereal staples. The same goes for agrichemical products.

• The entire school system was re structured and free education was provided. A huge literacy campaign involving 700,000 persons is being prepared for the beginning of 1980. Illiteracy is widespread in Nicaragua, and is especially rampant among the entire rural population. All students above the sixth grade are being mobilized for the "literacy crusade." Schools will be closed for four months in order to enable maximum participation by teachers and students. Cuba is providing technical and material assistance as well as educators for this campaign, which is explicitly modeled on the Cuban experience at the beginning of the 1960s. Such a campaign can be an important instrument in winning over the poor peasants to the revolution.

• A unified health-care system was established to provide medical care throughout the country; vast sanitary campaigns were launched for the first time in Nicaraguan history. A social security system is being implemented. Initial steps have been taken to ensure the distribution of drinking water to the poorest neighborhoods and to provide them with elementary social in fra structures (nurseries, clinics).

• After forty-two years of dictatorship, the democratic rights of the masses were guaranteed—freedom of assembly, association, press, and speech. The participation by women in the struggle elicit ed measures favoring an equal status.

• A decree was adopted controlling prices on basic food commodities. The Sandinista Defense Committees (CDSs) can function as bodies to guarantee its implementation. A campaign was launched against speculation on food staples. Measures were taken by the government to rebuild houses in the devastated working-class neighborhoods, and state control was extended to dwellings built illegally.

• The Nicaraguan government took an anti-imperialist position on various questions (Middle East, South Africa, etc.) and showed determined opposition to the military maneuvers against Cuba in the Caribbean and in Central America. A demonstration of 30,000 persons was organized to greet Vietnamese Premier Pham Van Dong.

• After the coup d'etat in El Salvador, the FSLN denounced this coup prepared by Washington.

The sum total of these measures, taken in a short period of time, dealt significant blows to the bourgeoisie.

Nevertheless, Somoza's holdings in the industrial domain were more limited than the traditional estimates indicated. Fideicomiso—the organization in charge of administering all of the expropriated property except for the lands—manages only a fairly small portion of all the industrial enterprises. Moreover, many Somoza enterprises were in deficit, and made a profit only as a result of the secret aid they got from the state. About 15,000 wage earners work in the various sectors controlled by Fideicomiso.

Nationalizaton of the banks enabled the state to acquire interests in many companies. However, it is estimated that the share of industrial production classified as under state control does not exceed 20 to 25 percent, including the mixed sector.

Agricultural production remains largely in the hands of the private sector—especially agricultural goods for export such as cotton, coffee—although it is true that about 40 percent of the cultivable lands belong to the INRA. Currently, out of an agriculturally-active population of 325,000 persons, only about 30,000 work in the sector placed directly under the control of INRA.

The economic strength of the ruling classes, therefore, remains great, greater than the FSLN leadership imagined when measures were taken to expropriate the Somozaists. The bourgeoisie has significant resources at its disposal to try to reestablish its positions on the political level.

In the short run, seeking to achieve a minimal restarting of private industrial enterprises and a recovery of agricultural production (harvest ing, seed ing, refrain ing from selling livestock outside the country) on the big and medium-sized farms that are still in their owners' hands stems from an objective necessity.

However, this should not create illusions about the function that the bourgeoisie can fulfill in reconstructing the country in the interests of the working masses. But for several weeks, statements by the FSLN leadership have stressed the important and necessary role of the national private sector in the "reconstruction of Nicaragua" and the "strengthening of a national economy" to break the ties of dependency, the interdependence of the state, mixed, and private sectors, and the fact that sectors of the "democratic and progressive bourgeoisie" are "actually on the side of the revolution and should work for the revolution" (Barricada, November 3, 1979).

Moreover, any economic recovery of a certain scope within the framework of a "mixed economy," or any capitalist investment, will be made only if international loans, banking credits at not too high interest rates, and various guarantees (convertibility of currency, favorable exchange rates, free importation of raw materials, wage limits) are given to the capitalists. The bourgeoisie will not be satisfied with general promises.

Pushed to the wall by the acute social and economic crisis and by the constraints of the international environment, the leadership of the FSLN and the Junta of the GRNN, in order to obtain participation of the private sector, are driven to give assurances to the bourgeoisie. Thus, Carlos Núñez, a Commander of the Revolution, explained on October 21, 1979 that credits would be allocated at favorable rates to the industrial, agricultural, and commercial sectors; that guarantees were being given concerning imports, provision of foreign exchange, and convertibility of the currency; that BID loans would also be used to aid the private sector; and that a wage plan would be implemented so that the wage demands stimulated by the organizational reinforcement of the working class should not go beyond a critical threshold that would endanger a recovery. Nevertheless, the FSLN is keeping the private sector under the threat of nationalization if it does not go along with the game.

In this stage of the revolutionary process, therefore, we are at a meeting-point between a series of economic measures that have struck the politically very weakened ruling classes, and short-term projects that, in order to meet the urgent needs created by the country's devastation, rely on the recovery of an economy whose current structure is divided into three spheres—private, mixed, and state-owned.

The foreign debt is a crushing burden. A big part of it, for the private as well as the state sector, consists of short- and medium-term loans. More than 50 percent of these loans were contracted with private banking institutions under worse terms than those granted by the imperialist financial institutions. At present, the GRNN has declared that it does not recognize three categories of debts—those concerning the supplying of weapons by Israel and Argentina (three precent of the total debt); those contracted under terms that violate the traditional rules of international loans; and those made up of loans that fat ten ed Somoza's foreign bank accounts. All of these exceptions somewhat reduce the volume of debt, but do not change the fundamental problem.

The Junta of the GRNN states that it is prepared to renegotiate the debt, but no important decision has been made for the time being. Moreover, a de facto moratorium exists, given the financial situation. The nature of the decisions to be adopted in the future will indicate the course that the FSLN leadership will take in this area.

8. The mass insurrection resulted in a high degree of self-organization. The social relationships of forces emerging from the victory are very largely in favor of the toiling masses. The bourgeoisie has lost all control over the armed forces. It is in this very favorable context that the activity and organization of the masses can develop.

The FSLN is now encouraging the creation and broadening of the CDSs. It is giving them a chief role in per forming a number of tasks in the neighborhoods and at the municipal level. Delegates from the CDSs make up the Sandinista Neighborhood Committees. Representatives to the District Council are chosen from within the neighborhood committees. The same is true at the provincial level. Organization at the municipal and provincial level is still very uneven among the different re gions.

The CDSs combine functions of administration, surveillance, organizing cultural and athletic activities, agitation, and political propaganda. They also represent the main organizations through which the political leadership of the FSLN is exercised on the local level.

The FSLN stimulated and led the formation of the Sand in ist Workers Federation (CST). It initiated negotiations with the other, smaller trade-union federations with the goal of forming a single workers' federation. The movement for trade-union organization progress ed rapidly after the victory, and the leadership of the FSLN supports this movement which helps consolidate a relationship of forces in favor of the workers.

Nevertheless, the FSLN's lack of traditions in trade-union work, and the shortage of experienced trade-union cadres, means that despite their political prestige, they are en counter ing difficulties in integrating layers of workers previously belonging to other trade unions, or unorganized, into the ranks of the CST. The FSLN is learning that more than political prestige and authority are necessary in order to integrate workers formerly belonging to other trade unions into the CST, and that the attempts to dispense with political education and persuasion can only facilitate the efforts of the trade-union bureaucracies tied to the bourgeois political parties to divide the workers.

The deep decline of the productive forces—a result not only of the civil war but also of the crisis of the capitalist system worldwide since 1975—demands an effort to raise production and imposes fairly strict limits on satisfying the demands of the working masses. But the whole problem is whether this effort will serve to produce a surplus to be absorbed by capitalist accumulation—which is inevitably the case with the present structure of the Nicaraguan economy—or whether it will aid in the development of an economy in transition to socialism in which restrictive measures would not be aimed at one part of the population in order to favor another part, the private owners of the means of production.

Since October, the central role assigned to the trade unions in the battle for production has tended to introduce dangerous confusion as to the function of the trade union organization in the present stage, especially since it is in addition to a policy of limiting wage increases.

In an economy where the private sector is still largely dominant, where labor power is a commodity, the trade-union organization must preserve its primary role of defending the workers as sell ers of labor power, which is, moreover, an important element in the mobilization of the masses for the struggle to overthrow capitalism. Of course, in the state-owned sector, the trade-union organization can be an instrument for the development of experiences of workers management, but this should not lead to eliminating its independence from the state or its fundamental role, which is determined by the overall nature of the economy. It is in this way that the trade union can help the leadership of the revolution to become conscious of the new problems and to outline new tasks.

A gigantic effort to organize agricultural workers and small peasants has been made by the FSLN. They are organized in the Association of Rural Workers (ATC) which is fully participating in the development of the agrarian reform. The same ambiguity exists with regard to the role of the ATC as with regard to the CST in the present stage. If it persists, this could lead to a disorientation of the agricultural workers and poor peasants, hamper ing the preparation of the necessary battles for the expropriation of the agribusiness sectors, which the bulk of the economy depend on, and for the defense of their immediate interests.

Finally, the FSLN is organizing broad layers of youth and women within the "July 19 Sand in ist Youth" and the "Association of Nicaraguan Women." In addition, teachers are organized in the AND EN. These three organizations can be important levers of mass mobilization.

The confrontation with imperialism is what the leadership of the FSLN is feverishly preparing for. It has correctly devoted a big part of its energies to building an army—the Sandinista People's Army (EPS)—based first and foremost on the troops stemming from the guerrilla struggle, to which the popular militias have been integrated. Only a strong and efficient regular army can diminish the human cost of fighting back against direct or indirect intervention by imperialism and its local allies, who can count on the forces of the National Guard concentrated in Honduras, which have already launched some hit-and-run attacks.

The leadership of the FSLN states that the absorption of the popular militias into the EPS is aimed at consolidating it by giving priority to the integration of those who actually took up arms in the struggle against Somoza. It states its intention to set up popular militias in the future structured around production units and workplaces, and formed on a voluntary basis. For the time being, the FSLN is planning to form, at a later stage, a vanguard party rooted in the masses organized within the CDSs.

This vast effort to organize the working masses, youth, and women is tending to consolidate the class relationship of forces stemming from the revolutionary overthrow of the dictatorship.

Up to the present, the GRNN has not been seen by the workers and peasants as an obstacle to the revolution. At the initiative of the FSLN, it has taken or ratified a series of measures tending to weaken the economic and political power of the bourgeoisie. It is thus identified in the eyes of the masses with the gains of the revolution.

After the dismantling of the repressive bodies of the Somozaist state, the bourgeoisie can no longer dictate its will, while the worker and peasant alliance cannot yet take all power into its hands. The masses' level of consciousness is no longer merely mold ed by the democratic goals of the struggle against Somoza and imperialism. The masses' class consciousness increasingly bears the stamp of the anticapitalist mobilizations. The anticapitalist content of the revolution should deepen in the face of the test of the economic crisis, which cannot be resolved by seeking to conciliate antagonistic class interests.

In these conditions, the primary task which dominates all others remains the organization, education, and raising of the level of consciousness of the masses, to prepare for the outcome of this transitional situation.

It is legitimate that the Sandinista leadership should seek to buy time if that time is utilized to jointly build and consolidate the instruments of military and political defense of the revolution. No ultraleft plunge can replace this necessary preparation, without which the masses would be the first victims of any attempt to precipitate a premature confrontation.

To make the mobilized masses conscious that these battles are inevitable, and to do so without adventuristically forcing the pace of the class struggle in its international context, is one of the most important and difficult tasks for the leadership of this revolution.

The FSLN leadership tends to use the position of strength it has acquired from its absolute control over the armed forces to try to control all of the social forces that have been set in motion by this revolution. However, those forces cannot be bent to the will either of a revolutionary leadership or of the bourgeoisie. The pace of radicalization will depend on the blows and counter blows between the masses and the exploiters.

Semispontaneous mobilizations of the workers and peasants, often going beyond the plans set by their leadership, will change the relationship of forces. Going beyond the government's measures, the masses, go ad ed by their most pressing needs and capitalist sabotage, will themselves take initiatives with respect to the land, factories, and housing. That is the historic lesson of all revolutions.

The strength of the FSLN rests not only on the EPS, but above all on the degree of mass organization and mobilization, which directly influences the role and evolution of that army. Any weakness in orientation in this area could be reflected in:

• An underestimation of the function of the semispontaneous mass mobilizations in changing the relationship of forces, and their role in the development of consciousness by sectors of the masses that lack a long tradition of organized struggles;

• A desire to control and prevent "outflanking". and the conviction that the FSLN alone embodies the revolutionary process. (This has already led it to use administrative and repressive measures against the "ultralefts," who are placed in the category of "counterrevolutionaries" for this purpose.)

• An underestimation of the possibilities offered the bourgeoisie on the political level after a certain period due to their economic resources, and the idea that any alliance with a bourgeois sector can re main a mere maneuver, completely and easily controllable.

9. Imperialism will use all of its options to try to contain, halt, and violently disrupt the revolution in progress.

It still holds in reserve the possibility of direct military intervention, and can prepare it from neighboring countries by carrying out multiple acts of sabotage or forming a counterrevolutionary "guerrilla" force. The prospect of intervention itself puts pressure on the FSLN to moderate its decisions.

In the present phase, the imperialist powers, above all American imperialism, are not trying to strangle the Nicaraguan revolution for fear of pushing it into a more radical course. They want to inject loans into Nicaragua to increase the value of the capitalist sector's role and function. The pressing need for food, financial, technical, and economic aid is also used as a means of pressure, because of the ever-present threat that food shortages and dramatic social problems will accumulate in the first six months of 1980 and provoke discontent that could weaken the mass support and authority enjoyed by the Sandinista leadership.

Imperialism has a pernicious weapon of intervention through the foreign debt. It is not seeking to precipitate events. It appears ready to accept a long-term restructuring plan and even a temporary moratorium. Its goal is to involve the GRNN in a real renegotiation of the debt that would imply, on the one hand, recognition of a number of obligations toward the international financial institutions, and, on the other hand, direct intervention by the IMF to one degree or another in the Nicaraguan economy.

This last maneuver, like the support given to industrial or agricultural exporting sectors, is aimed at maintaining ties with the capitalist world market. In this operation, the policy of some Latin American bourgeoisies—whatever their apparent or real conflicts with American imperialism in the short run—also function to persuade Nicaragua not to break its ties with the Latin American market and take the Cuban road. In the latter case, a test of strength with imperialism is inevitable.

The liquidation of the National Guard and dismemberment of the Somozaist state are not equivalent to the destruction and defeat of the Nicaraguan bourgeoisie as a whole. The latter still possess es the bulk of the industrial means of production, a large share of the lands devoted to cash crops (cotton, coffee), and livestock.

A section of the bourgeoisie enjoys a degree of legitimacy in the eyes of a part of the population, for it was an integral part of the struggle against Somoza. That is also the case for a sector of the religious hierarchy, for example, the archbishop of Managua, Miguel Obando y Bravo.

It is using this legitimacy and its economic power to negotiate its "participation in the process." This formula reflects the choice made by those who see in it the best way to control the course of the revolution, that is, to lead it into the rut of a "mixed economy."

However, the reactions within the bourgeois class are differentiated; an investment strike and sabotage are also favored. It is exploiting to the hilt its ties with imperialism and the Latin American bourgeoisies. Thus, the Superior Council of Private Enterprise is making multiple entreaties for support from its sister organizations in Latin American and for large loans from the imperialist financial institutions, with the goal of strengthening its bargaining power in the framework of "national reconstruction."

The bourgeoisie is seeking to politically exploit its participation in the government, which the FSLN granted it in the name of a temporary alliance with a bourgeois sector. It is holding it up to the world bourgeoisie as the guarantee that "democracy" and private property will be re spected in Nicaragua. Its presence in the government constitutes an implicit veto power over a series of radical anticapitalist measures; their adoption would immediately be followed by a break in its participation in the government and the Central Bank. Therefore, a very harsh battle would immediately ensue at the international as well as national level. The Nicaraguan bourgeoisie is thus trying to repeat in peacetime the experience of the FAO and even the FPN, which failed in wartime owing to the mass insurrection and the breakup of the National Guard.

Any plan to consolidate a bourgeois state is made more difficult to concretize owing to the dislocation of the old army and its replacement by the FSLN troops. To compensate for this weakness, the Nicaraguan bourgeoisie, in concert with the bourgeoisies of various Latin American countries, will try to apply pressure in order to "regularize" the Sand in ist People's Army, at the slightest sign of an ebb in the mass mobilizations.

Plantation owners and industrialists are seeking to form ties with the petty bourgeoisie in order to consolidate their social base of support and be able to negotiate or fight back under better conditions.

The political offensive of the bourgeoisie is focused on one point—actual implementation of the "Fundamental Statute of the Republic," which reflects the agreements made in June 1979. For the bourgeoisie, it is a matter of making the country's legal institutions the only real decision-making centers. It is calling for the convening of the Council of State, which, according to the GRNN's program, was supposed to draft a constitution and electoral law, and could veto the Junta's decisions by a two-thirds majority. It is demanding that the Supreme Court assert its power. It has already launched the issue of free elections and a constituent assembly. Institutionalization and the fight for "free elections" represent the classic blows of the bourgeois-democratic counterrevolution.

The FSLN postponed the convening of the Council of State until May 1980. It stresses the need to change the composition of that body to increase the representation of the mass organizations, to the detriment of the most conservative sectors of the bourgeoisie. Nonetheless, it states that "the fatherland more than ever needs its children and the united action of the entire nation—workers, peasants, the petty bourgeoisie, and the democratic, progressive sectors of the bourgeoisie."

10. Although greatly dismembered, a bourgeois state persists, with its fundamental laws that protect private ownership of the means of production (land property, industry), hence capitalist accumulation.

The special situation of dual power stemming from the revolutionary overthrow of the Somozaist dictatorship is the result of the combination of the two most characteristic elements of the beginning of this revolution—first, a prolonged mass insurrection in the country's main urban centers and a military victory by the armed forces of the FSLN; second, the shattering of the National Guard and repressive forces around which the entire organization of the Somozaist state power was structured.

The ruling classes, without control over the repressive apparatus, nevertheless have various centers of power at their disposal, based mainly on their economic strength. They are counterposed to the mass centers of power formed in the course and in the wake of the victory.

The bourgeoisie controls economic institutions (Higher Council on Industry, Chamber of Commerce, etc.) supported by imperialism and the Latin American bourgeoisies. The landowners' networks of caciques continue to exist in the countryside, although weakened. The representatives of big business are present in the Junta, the ministries—above all the economic ministries—in the civil administrative apparatus, and in the Central Bank. Through this medium, they have control over the decision-making mechanisms and running implementation of those decisions.

The Catholic church hierarchy supports the bourgeoisie. Some bourgeois parties, like the MDN, are present in the government. Other bourgeois sectors are trying to rebuild "new" political parties—the Social Democratic Party, Social Christian Party, and Democratic Conservatives.

Pitted against this bourgeois camp are the CDSs, the mass organizations such as the CST, ATC, July 19 Sandinista Youth, the Association of Nicaraguan Women, and the AND EN. Finally, and especially, the leadership of the FSLN totally controls the Sand in ist People's Army, the direct outgrowth of the FSLN's revolutionary armed struggle and of the insurrectionary upsurge of the urban masses and poor peasants. On this basis, and in the framework of the current relationship of forces between the classes, the FSLN currently holds decision-making power over the strategic political questions.

Thus, the special nature of this situation of dual power is reflected on one side by the nonexistence of a centralized executive power of the bourgeoisie within a government (whatever its limited decision-making capacities), which is generally the case in situations of dual power. On the other side, while the emerging popular power does not have a real centralized expression, the degree of FSLN control over the real executive power is directly related to the role occupied by the EPS in the organization of the state. This is reflected, moreover, in the form of a contradiction between the legal norms of the state apparatus and the actual power re siding in the EPS command, which blends with the FSLN leadership.

This organization developed an anti-imperialist and anti dictatorial orientation under the influence of the Cuban revolution. Marxist currents arose within it. Socially and politically heterogeneous, it underwent a transformation under the impact of the revolutionary mass upsurge that in turn impelled it to take conscious steps to mobilize the masses. This evolution was reflected in a growing integration and implantation of the FSLN among the working masses, as well as by the growth of the tendencies claiming to be Marxist.

The present phase of the revolution poses new problems and new choices to this organization which is still heterogeneous. It can only stimulate debates and differentiations within it. Sectors of the Nicaraguan and Latin American bourgeoisies, and even of imperialism, will seek to provoke splits on the right in order to exploit them, contain the revolution, and prevent its growing over into a socialist revolution. The place, role, and nature of the GRNN, a coalition government between the FSLN and a sector of the bourgeoisie, must be grasped in the context of this transitional phase.

The two poles of power are reflected within the government, and partly within the FSLN. They are intertwined in the various decision-making bodies of the state apparatus (ministries, Central Bank, organizations of economic management in the nationalized sector, etc.). For example, the personnel of the Central Bank, like its management, are still mainly in the hands of representatives of the liberal bourgeoisie and of the technocrats. On the other hand, the INRA, established by the FSLN, constitutes in itself a kind of miniature government directly under its control, which strips the Ministry of Agriculture of its content. The bourgeoisie will try to reestablish its political positions by exploiting its presence in the state apparatus and government.

Such a situation cannot last very long: it must find a solution. It can lead either to the course followed by the Algerian revolution or the path traced by the Cuban revolution. Any new advance for the revolution will necessitate a breakup—in one form or another—of the governmental coalition, and, in that sense, will lead to a situation similar to that which the Cuban revolution went through between June and October 1959.

This fundamentally depends on the dialectic that is established among the mass movement, the degree of its organization, the initiatives taken by the FSLN, and the FSLN's own political evolution, that is, on the political hegemony gained by those currents within it that have the most ties. to the working masses and that put forward proletarian positions.

11. The semicolonial character of Nicaragua, and the extent of the devastation, mean that the most immediate needs of the masses cannot be satisfied in the frame work of a so-called mixed economy, which can only be capitalist, and whose development will be reversed by the forces of the capitalist world market. The reconstruction effort of the working masses would thus be rewarded by austerity, which is necessary for the relaunching of a new investment cycle.

To be sure, rapid measures to expropriate the ruling class would lead to an immediate confrontation with the national and international bourgeoisie. Aid would be immediately cut off. The Nicaraguan people would have to face imperialist intervention. The danger of an economic paralysis would be acute, unless Nicaragua's international isolation were broken with the help of the USSR. But it is also certain that a relatively prolonged period of bourgeois accumulation and strengthening of the private sector would consolidate the ties between imperialism and the Nicaraguan bourgeoisie. It would give the latter the forces with which to vie with the FSLN for political power and decide the situation to its own benefit.

The only guarantee of avoiding a counterrevolutionary solution to this crisis—whatever its intermediary stages—is to strengthen the existing ties between the FSLN, which must adopt a correct revolutionary orientation as the leadership of the revolution, and the mobilized masses.

Any advance of the revolution depends on the mobilization of the workers and peasants around revolutionary goals—understood and accepted by them—and on the strengthening of their organization. Any step backward, on the contrary, leads to a decline in the mobilization, in the level of mass organization, and in the popular support won by the FSLN in the struggle.

The course of the class struggle in Nicaragua indicates the following central tasks of reconstruction in the interests of the workers and peasants:

a. The strengthening of the CST as the single workers federation. The best way to convince the workers as a whole of the advantage of trade-union unification within a single federation is, on the one hand, to initiate a broad political discussion with the members and leaderships of the other, smaller federations; and, on the other hand, to ensure internal democracy enabling the workers to choose the leadership that they place their confidence in.

In a situation of scarcity caused by the destruction of the civil war and international isolation, it is inevitable that the battle for reconstruction and the restarting of the economy should translate into big sacrifices on the part of the workers. But these sacrifices will only be comprehensible and compatible with the strengthening of a trade union if the workers can freely discuss within all of their organizations and decide themselves on the allocation of the social surplus, and if workers control develops in the sector that remains privately owned. The type of trade-union organization best adapted to these tasks is one whose rank-and-file structures are based on the workplaces, and which also strives to organize the semiproletarianized layers and small artisans.

b. Developing and strengthening the ATC, the only organization that can keep the revolution a vital force in the countryside, organize the small peasants and agricultural workers, taking up their demands and needs and getting them directly involved in the activity of the INRA. Consolidation of the ATC is a decisive factor for prop el ling further INRA's expropriations of the big landowners who control an important segment of cash crops for export, and who remain one of the most solid forces of the counterrevolution. The alliance between the CST and the ATC also serves to cement the bloc of the two decisive social forces, i.e. the worker-peasant alliance, for the deepening of the anticapitalist struggle.

c. Coordinating and democratically centralizing the CDSs on the regional and national levels, establishing their links with the workplaces, and their real participation in the sum total of socioeconomic decisions as organs of people's power. In this way they will broaden out their present tasks (surveillance, solving immediate neighborhood problems) and will take on the character of organs of power.

d. Arming the masses as the point toward which the entire movement for the organization of the oppressed and exploited converges. The priority is, of course, to form a regular army having all the technical means available with which to counter the imperialist threats and counterrevolutionary conspiracies.

But to really form militias in the workplaces, in conformity with the plans announced by the FSLN, is the most effective way of arming the workers. They must collectively control the weapons. With the technical support of the regular army, the working masses, organized in the CST, ATC, student and women's organizations, can form their own armed militias to support the revolution and defend their gains, their organizations, and the organs of power.

e. Construction of a revolutionary socialist, proletarian party. It is the necessary instrument in order to unite the leadership and the masses, and permit swift reactions to sharp changes in the class struggle. It is the necessary instrument for the political education of cadres, for discussion of all the key problems of the revolution, and for the collective development of a revolutionary policy for the new stage opened up by the military and insurrectionary victory. A democratically centralized party is the best guarantee of consolidating the gains of the workers through the creation of a workers state based on the centralization of the mass workers', peasants', and soldiers' committees.

Unity of the forces of the workers movement, where different currents exist, is not achieved through the formation of a single party imposed by state coercion. But the effort to unify revolutionists in a vanguard party that respects the right to hold different opinions is the most powerful tool, not only for expropriating the bourgeoisie, but for accomplishing the tasks of reconstructing society on a planned and rational basis.

However, the right of different workers parties to exist is one of the conditions that can guarantee the democratic rights of the working masses, the unity of the masses regardless of their different levels of consciousness at a given moment, and the broadest and most direct exercise of power.

As the development of the revolutionary process shows, a transitional program for the period ahead especially includes the following points:

• Deepening of the agrarian reform through expropriation of the agricultural exporting bourgeoisie (cotton, coffee) whose ties with the imperialist market are strong and whose capacity for economic sabotage is high. More generally, the agrarian reform cannot achieve its proclaimed goals in the medium term without a close connection with industry, which will require nationalization under workers control.

• Shifting the tax burden to the most comfortable layers of the population.

• Expropriation of the banks and imperialist companies, and establishment of a single bank.

• Establishment of a monopoly of foreign trade, with its consequences on the monetary plane.

• Refusal to be tied to the imperialist financial institutions through the vehicle of the foreign debt. These institutions would then dictate their economic and social decisions.

• Establishment, with the participation of the mass organizations, of an economic plan of reconstruction based on state control of the land, industry, and natural resources. Such a plan must take into account the requirements of state accumulation and the fundamental needs of the masses.

• Adoption of measures (housing, health, social infrastructure) that raise the standard of living of the popular masses, both rural and urban, and that can be carried out by the mass organizations (CDS, ATC). These measures are indispensable to strengthen mobilizations at a time when an intense production effort is demanded.

• Application of egalitarian norms in the realm of wages and use of state property (houses, cars, etc.) by officials.

• Full distribution of information to the population to facilitate its participation and ability to make decisions in the organs of people's power.

• Continual repression of Somozaist activities and organizations and of the agents of imperialism; and establishment of people's tribunals, elected by the mass organizations, to judge their crimes.

• Development of a revolutionary internationalist policy aiming to extend the revolution as the best way to defend the Nicaraguan revolution.

• To put forward the slogan today of a constituent assembly based on "free elections" would amount to impeding the assertion of the anticapitalist strength of the proletariat. It would be to counterpose the creation of bourgeois parliamentary institutions to the development and centralization on the national level of the organs of power of the masses. Such institutions can only facilitate the bourgeoisie's political counteroffensive, derail the dynamic of the mass movement, and break the dynamic that has been established between the activity of the masses and the leadership of the FSLN.

It is by supporting all the decisions that make it possible to respond to the needs of the working population that the clashes to come in the struggle to build a workers and peasants government are most effectively prepared for.

12. The Nicaraguan revolution is the direct object of a confrontation between classes on the international scale. The difficulties that the United States encountered at the end of 1978 in putting its views across, and in intervening in 1979 (OAS resolution) reveal American imperialism's deep crisis after the defeat it suffered in Vietnam in 1975.

But these difficulties for Carter should not lead us to conclude that imperialism will not do everything it can to smash this revolution that has broken out right in its own back yard. Washington does not want to be caught short by a new Cuba. Thus the future of this revolution is also closely tied to the relationship of forces on the international level.

The Cuban leadership provided decisive support to the battle against the Somoza dictatorship. Cuba is massively aiding the revolution after its victory with material, technical, and food aid. Hundreds of teachers, doctors, and nurses are providing assistance to the struggle of the working masses of Nicaragua. The internationalism of the Cuban leadership has clearly shown itself in favor of this revolution.

Each new advance of the revolution in Nicaragua, with the shock wave it directly causes throughout Central America, not only raises the possibility of an extension of the revolution, but places before the Cuban leadership two objective contradictions.

First of all, to loosen American imperialism's stranglehold over Cuba, the Cuban leadership is correctly trying to develop economic relations with the countries of Latin America (Mexico, Venezuela, etc.). However, while these bourgeoisies can accept and even support an anti dictatorial movement—with the aim of winning easier access to the Central American market—they are determined to prevent the emergence of a socialist revolution in Central America. They will therefore bargain the extension and strengthening of their commercial and diplomatic relations with Cuba against this goal.

Furthermore, the entire orientation of the Soviet bureaucracy is opposed to a break in the international status quo, in the political and military spheres, especially in a part of the world of such interest to the United States. The Cuban leadership must also take this counterrevolutionary choice into account, since only the USSR and the workers states could furnish the necessary aid to Nicaragua in the event of a break with the capitalist world market. Thus, the revolutionary upsurge in Nicaragua is an important test for the Cuban leadership.

The counterattack launched by the United States against Cuba on the pretext of the "discovery" of Soviet "combat troops" on the island, was aimed not only at issuing a warning to Castro, but also at intervening in the negotiations between Havana and Moscow, to get Moscow to pressure Cuba to not only reduce its aid to the Nicaraguan revolution, but apply pressure to prevent its growing over into a socialist revolution.

Therefore, the defense of Cuba against imperialist pressure and the lifting of the economic blockade are tied to the defense of the Nicaraguan revolution.

13. The shock wave produced by the example of the Nicaraguan revolution is shaking the countries of Central America, especially since the duration of the open and massive struggle against Somoza had already made possible the forming of ties between the vanguard movements of the area.

The victory of the FSLN had a powerful impact on all of Central America, but especially on El Salvador, where the maturing of the social and political crisis is most advanced.

The agrarian question is at the center of the crisis of El Salvador, a country where more than 4,200,000 people are crowded into an area six times smaller than Nicaragua. Underemployment and unemployment are having devastating effects. More than 30 percent of the "economically active" rural population works only two or three months a year and 20 percent work a maximum of six months a year.

Under the pressure of American imperialism—which while firmly supporting the military government, wanted to install some safety valves—a limited agrarian reform plan was launched in 1977 under President Arturo Arm an do Molina. It was quickly shelved, not only because of the rejection by the landholding oligarchy, but because the combativity of the agricultural workers and pauperized peasants threatened to break through the narrow limits of this reform.

The social and political crisis was exacerbated after 1978, in an ever dark er economic climate. The imperialist companies froze their investments; capital fled the country.

Strikes spread; workers occupied companies that closed down or laid them off. They challenged the security forces with increasing assurance.

The audacity of the armed actions undertaken by the urban resistance fronts increased. Mass demonstrations in the capital, San Salvador, became regular occurrences, despite the brutality of the military repression.

American imperialism feared a second Nicaragua. The "democratic opening" announced by Romero—and decided by Washington—for the 1980 elections appeared less and less likely to prevent a popular insurrection. The social base of the dictatorship was rapidly shrinking; the class polarization was intensifying; the following of the revolutionary organizations was growing.

In mid-October, Washington concocted a coup d'état that permitted it to get rid of Romero in a suitable manner and to reorganize the ruling class's system of power around military officers and the Christian Democratic Party.

Through this imperialism and the Salvadorian bourgeoisie were aiming to win back sectors of the petty bourgeoisie, to make use of the shameful support the CP is giving the junta, and to isolate the revolutionary organizations.

The coup d'état may, of course, change the pace and the forms of the class conflicts taking place. However, the close relationship that exists between any plan for a "democratic opening" and the agrarian question raises serious questions about the substitute liberalizations cooked up by Washington. The strikes, land occupations, and clashes with the police that took place after October 15 reflect the deep instability as well as the social and political crisis that remain the dominant traits of the situation in El Salvador.

The impact on Latin America as a whole of the Nicaraguan revolution, and its direct repercussions in Central America, is considerable.

First of all, it was the oldest dictatorship in Latin America, whose weight was felt throughout Central America, that was ousted.

Further, the emergence of this revolution takes place in the context of a rising curve of mass activity on the continent since 1977, and can only strengthen that trend.

Finally, the general traits of the Nicaraguan revolutionary process, beyond their specific features, can now be assimilated by the most conscious sectors of the proletariat as elements in the definition of a revolutionary strategy.

Thus, this revolution has brought a number of factors into relief. Among these are: the opening wedge that can be made by the inter capitalist contradictions and the crisis of bourgeois leadership under the combined blows of the urban semiproletarianized masses, working class, agricultural laborers, pauperized peasants, and sectors of the petty bourgeoisie; the overlapping of the anti-imperialist and anti dictatorial struggles and their anticapitalist dynamic; the central role of the masses' own organization in the struggle against the dictatorship and in the maturing of conditions making for a convergence between a general strike, armed struggle, and mass insurrection; the predominance in the first phase of the struggle of proletarian forms of organization—trade-union and self-defense pickets, popular militias, CDCs, CDT, and armed detachments—and their dislocating effects on the bourgeois army; the leading role of the industrial and rural proletariat and the pauperized peasants in the deepening of the permanent revolution; the vital necessity of a revolutionary leadership to guide this process to its finish, that is, to expropriate the capitalists and nationalize the sum total of the means of production, destroy the bourgeois state, institutions, and army, build a state based on the workers' organs of power, draw up an overall economic plan corresponding to the interests of the toiling population, and defend the gains of the revolution by arming the people.

14. The Fourth International and its sections must mobilize all their forces to defend the Nicaraguan revolution and support the FSLN.

The American imperialists are already fo ment ing their plans for intervention to prevent the birth of a new Cuba in Latin America. To do so, they will need the complicity and open participation, to one degree or another, of the Latin American bourgeoisies.

The militants of the Fourth International in all countries of the world—especially those in the Latin American sections and their comrades fighting in the very heart of the imperialist bastion—must revive the example of proletarian internationalism shown by the movement against the imperialist war in Vietnam, which helped inflict a resounding defeat on Washington.

The economic and food weapon is also part of the international bourgeoisie's arsenal of reprisals against a revolution that inherited the ruins bequeathed to it by a bloody dictatorship.

The unified solidarity and aid movement will have to use all available means to give material support to Nicaragua.

It will demand that the mass workers organizations, humanitarian institutions, and religious organizations pool their re sources to meet the immediate needs of the Nicaraguan people.

It will expose those governments that indulge in humanitarian declarations while do ling out with an eye-dropper sums that are laughable compared with the needs of a population deprived of food and medical care. It will demand that these governments provide massive aid, without delay or strings attached, to the authorities of free Nicaragua.

The organizations of the Fourth International, in building the solidarity and aid movement, will strive to create a united front of all the workers parties and trade unions, in order to forge the chain of class solidarity with the workers of Nicaragua. In this context, they shall renew the urgent appeal to the workers states that Che Guevara made to them for defense of the Vietnamese revolution. Following Cuba's example, the workers states should all contribute massive, unconditional material aid to the Nicaraguan revolution.

In setting forth its program and conceptions, the Fourth International places itself firmly on the side of the FSLN's fight to ensure the victory of the socialist revolution.

The revolutionary upsurge in Nicaragua, and the FSLN's evolution in the course of the battle, offer the Fourth International an enormous opportunity and big responsibility to go forward in our historic task of solving the crisis of leadership of the world working class, and building the international party of socialist revolution. The cadres of the world Trotskyist movement constitute the irreplaceable nucleus of this world proletarian party. We defend the Leninist program and the method of the transitional program, which are essential to the victory of the working masses over the nuclear annihilation that will otherwise engulf humanity.

Due to the crimes of Social Democracy and of Stalinism, however, the building of a mass revolutionary workers international is a task whose solution is only at an initial stage. The development of revolutionary currents independent of Stalinism, as happened in Cuba and as is happening in Nicaragua, is therefore of great importance for the Fourth International and for increasing the impact of our revolutionary program and perspectives.

The organized militants of the Fourth International in Nicaragua shall be an integral part of any FSLN project to build a vanguard party. They will join with the best militants and cadres, who are in fact driving forward the revolutionary process, and will defend our entire program for building a workers state, for democratic soviet-type organization of the working masses, and for proletarian internationalism.