Organize Democratic Councils of the Workers, Peasants, Slum Dwellers, and Students!
Struggle for the Arming of the Proletariat and the Formation of a Popular Militia!
Build a Revolutionary Party!
Fourteen months ago, as a result of the September 4, 1970, elections and an agreement between the parties of the Unidad Popular (Popular Unity)* and the Partido Demócrata-Cristiano (Christian Democrats), Salvador Allende was inaugurated as president of Chile and formed a popular front government. This was a major event that all formations both within the country and in the Americas as a whole had to take a stand on. From the beginning it served as a touchstone, revealing the concepts and attitudes of the various currents in the workers' movement. The experiment in Chile is being watched throughout the world, particularly as a test of the efficacy of the electoral, parliamentary, and peaceful road that has been advocated by the reformists as a way of achieving socialism.
* The Partido Social-Demócrata, Acción Popular Independiente, Movimiento de Acción Popular Unitaria, Partido Radical, Partido Comunista, and Partido Socialista.
In a setting of vigorous mobilizations of opposing social and political forces, the crisis in Chile is becoming increasingly acute. Particularly since the defeat suffered by the masses of Bolivia last August, the contradictions and the struggle in Latin America have come to a focal point in Chile. Thus it is imperative for revolutionary Marxists to grasp the nature of the events, to understand the tendencies that are developing and the issues that are coming to the fore, and to define their position without any ambiguity so as to be able to intervene effectively.
1. The victory of the Cuban revolution — which coincided with the irreversible crisis of the bourgeois or petty-bourgeois revolutionary nationalist movements that marked an entire stage of the political struggle in many Latin American countries-led U.S. imperialism and the indigenous ruling classes to reexamine where they stood. On the one hand, the imperialists stepped up their military preparations, with an eye to the possible danger of revolutionary struggles inspired by the Cuban example; on the other hand, they projected a reformist course the aim of which was to reinforce certain economic sectors considered to be the most dynamic, to favor a shift in the relationship of forces within the ruling classes toward the "new" bourgeois layers, and to broaden, even if but a little, the mass base of the system. This attempt — to which Washington, however, allotted only derisory funds under the so-called Alliance for Progress — ended in total defeat. Within this context, the reformist experiments, or those tending in that direction (for example, Goulart in Brazil, Belaúnde in Peru) were either crushed in the egg or soon ended in bankruptcy. One of the consequences of this was the proliferation of military regimes, most of them reactionary, and the tendency to use the army on an increasing scale as a substitute for the traditional political mechanisms that had proved incapable of carrying out their tasks.
The dictatorship of the Brazilian gorillas was one of the variants adopted to establish a relative political equilibrium and to revive the economy through increased exploitation of the working class and the toiling masses as a whole. Another variant was an expansion of reformism that aimed at modernizing and rationalizing the economic and social structures, at imposing a new balance within the ruling classes themselves at the expense of the traditional oligarchy, and at establishing better and more active relations with the masses or considerable layers of them. The pilot experiment in this was the military regime set up in Peru by Velasco Alvarado in October 1968.
The relative success of the Peruvian regime, combined with the defeats suffered by other governments or the dead ends in which they found themselves, favored analogous reformist tendencies — military or civilian — stepping forward in other countries, even if they remained only incipient. As a whole, these currents raised the question of modernizing the agricultural structures through agrarian reforms directed against the most conservative landholding layers and designed to foster the formation of layers of small and middle peasant owners. They sought a more substantial displacement of capital toward the industrial and urban sectors of the economy in general with the idea of breaking the direct imperialist domination of the traditional raw materials sectors. Against the old setup, as partisans of a more vigorous intervention in the economy by the state, to which they assigned an increasing role as a stabilizer, they favored "collaboration" with the so-called modern industrial sectors. Such an orientation, as they saw it, would make possible an improvement in relations with the masses, which, within strict limits, could play a role in supporting the new regimes against the resistance and counterattacks of the ultras.
2. The events in Chile in recent years come within this more general tendency. It must not be forgotten that the Frei regime itself began as a reformist experiment that sought to modernize socio-economic structures, particularly through an agrarian reform, increased intervention by the state, and the final displacement of the former oligarchical ruling layers. Thus in a general way, the Popular Unity government stands as a continuator of the government that preceded it. It was not accidental that in the period before the September 4 election, sectors of the Popular Unity and the Christian Democrats did not exclude running a common candidate and that the Christian Democrats stood on a program analogous to that of Allende's front. Even more significantly — the new president did not project a new agrarian reform, but limited himself to applying the reform adopted by Frei.
The essentially reformist character of the Allende government conforms, moreover, with the program presented before and after the elections. Basically this program projects carrying out the Christian Democratic agrarian reform, ending the direct imperialist grip on the exploitation of raw materials, the statization of a series of industrial sectors, and the nationalization of the banks. This program, if it were carried out in its entirety, would greatly alter Chile's economic structure, bringing about considerable modifications in the relationship of class forces, in the division of the national income, and in the political role played by the different forces. But it would not involve a qualitative change — Chile would not cease to be a capitalist country dominated by the law of profit and still integrated in the imperialist world structure. In the countryside, agriculture would be marked more and more by the growth of capitalist enterprises and layers of land-owning small and middle peasants that would act as stabilizing elements, at least for the time being. The industrial bourgeoisie would still be the strongest and most dynamic class economically, it would retain and even strengthen its links with international capitalism, and, in the final analysis, it would be the main beneficiary of the new economic and political equilibrium and of the rationalization of the system, including through the presence of a very important sector controlled by the state.
Maintenance of the basic economic structure of capitalism is guaranteed all the more by the fact that the Popular Unity fought for the presidency not only on a strictly electoral level but committed itself to work within the framework of the pre-existing state apparatus (parliament, administrative apparatus, constitutionally authorized bodies of control such as the police, the army). That is why Alessandri and Tomic, who were supported at the time by virtually all the bourgeois voters, agreed to abide by the electoral outcome and permit Allende to take office (the factions favoring a coup d'etat consisted of only very small groupings even within the army).
3. While the events in Chile fall within a more general context of analogous tendencies that are either potential or already operative in other Latin American countries, they are nevertheless marked by very important specific traits that clearly differentiate the Allende regime from any other regime in Latin America.
First of all, while Peruvian reformism is being carried out by a military leadership that has displaced the traditional bourgeois parties, in Chile guidance is being undertaken by a coalition whose base is to be found essentially among the workers, the peasants, and the slum dwellers, and in which the two workers' parties exercise unquestionable preponderance. Thus Chilean reformism is being conducted under the leadership of a workers' bureaucracy.
The question arises as to whether the Allende government is a popular front government in the traditional sense of the term. It has been argued that the bourgeoisie as such, represented politically by the Christian Democrats and to a lesser degree by the National party, is not directly represented in the government. But, even leaving aside the fact that at least one of the parties in the coalition was traditionally a bourgeois party, the bourgeoisie exercises its influence through the petty-bourgeois parties that were included in both the Popular Unity and in the government. In addition, Allende is continually obliged to negotiate with the majority bloc in a parliament dominated by the Christian Democratic party, which permitted him to be elected and which can paralyze anything he undertakes whenever it chooses. Finally — and this is decisive — the class-collaborationist nature of the coalition was determined by its acceptance of the fundamental economic framework of the capitalist system and the bourgeois state apparatus.
Such a characterization should not lead one to identify the movement of the masses with the coalition nor even to simplify too much the problem of the relationship between Allende and the masses. Allende's victory was the outcome of a long history of hard battles, of many ups and downs, of the slow ripening of a proletariat that is among the oldest and most homogeneous in Latin America. In the eyes of the workers, the peasants, and the plebeian layers of the slums, the September 4, 1970, election represented a victory over the bourgeoisie, a historic step forward in the struggle for the elimination of capitalist exploitation. It expressed a new relationship of forces, more favorable to the masses than ever before. All this became translated after September 4 into an extraordinary upsurge, a broad mobilization of the working class and the peasantry, a radicalization of layers of the petty bourgeoisie, a rise in political consciousness among the plebeian sectors of the big cities. Broad layers of the vanguard, inspired by the mobilization of the masses and confronted by immediate political necessities, began discussing the main themes of revolutionary strategy and the problem of how to get from capitalism to socialism.
4. One of the fundamental factors in the situation in Chile is the inevitable tendency of the mass mobilization to break through the framework of reformism and class collaborationism prescribed by Allende. This, in the final analysis, is what provokes the sharpest conflicts and alarms the indigenous bourgeoisie and the imperialists. Out of fear of being overwhelmed, they raise the question of an inevitable confrontation.
In other words, the bourgeoisie, understanding its necessity, was inclined to accept and even to foster a reformist operation. After the defeat of Frei, this could only be attempted under the leadership of the workers' parties. But it fears the dynamics of a mass movement that could break through the framework of reformism, precipitating a genuine revolutionary crisis and placing on the agenda the question of power. In the same way, imperialism fears that the dynamics of the situation in Chile could have explosive effects on a continental scale, inspiring new upsurges of the proletariat and the peasantry.
In fact, in the period since the election, the workers and peasants have not at all limited themselves to supporting Allende and waiting for the government to act. They have often taken the initiative, obliging the government to approve the things that have been done. More importantly, the practical actions undertaken by the masses have often gone beyond the limits of the program of the Popular Unity. Peasants have taken over land without waiting for formal decisions and have even seized properties that could not be touched, according to the law. Workers have undertaken actions along the same lines, accelerating the process of statization and hitting enterprises that in principle were to be left in the sector of privately owned property. For the bourgeoisie this involved a crucial question — a substantial extension of expropriations beyond the projected limits raised the danger of gravely weakening its social weight, of more profoundly altering the relationship of forces. This could prevent it from effectively carrying out the projected restructuring of the economy to its own benefit. The bourgeoisie recognized at the same time that as this course gathered headway, the working class and the peasantry, by force of circumstances, would more and more be compelled to deal with the question of power by cutting through the limits of the constitution and forming qualitatively new bodies of proletarian power.
In the currently developing conflicts, the contending forces are mobilizing and reacting more and more sharply in relation to issues that must be decided in a relatively short time. The masses — at least the layers in the forefront — are not ready to give up their offensive and are seeking to bring to bear the greater social and political weight they have gained. The bourgeoisie is combining defensive operations and sallies designed to encourage its troops. For the bourgeoisie, it is essential to gain exact delimitation of the three economic "areas" (state, private, mixed) and to maintain the political structures of the system. The latter is required as a guarantee against any tendency to go beyond the framework of the reformist experiment. Allende and his coalition, unable to accede to measures that might provoke a break with the masses or even considerable sectors of the masses, are compelled to reply to the attacks of the bourgeoisie; but at the same time they continually seek to hold back the masses and to counter the pressures exerted from the left. They need to maintain an appreciable margin for maneuver and to avoid or to postpone any major confrontation. This is the meaning of the widely applied measure called intervención, which, by designating a manager to act in the name of the government, offers a certain satisfaction to the workers while at the same time not necessarily implying expropriation, thus maintaining capitalist property relations. This is also the meaning of the projected single chamber parliament, which, if it is accepted, would permit the government to carry out its program more rapidly and would better reflect the existing relationship of forces in Chile while on the other hand guaranteeing to the bourgeoisie the preservation of parliamentary structures completely within the bourgeois tradition.
5. In a situation like the one in Chile today, the different forces are not always in position to strictly pick and choose what they will get into or to act in accordance with a thought-out overall plan. The contradictions and potential conflicts accumulate from day to day, and events that are insignificant in themselves, and difficult to anticipate, can precipitate dramatic confrontations at practically any moment. This must never be forgotten, and it would be a grave error for the workers' movement to lull itself with the illusion of a painless unfolding of events.
However, it is unlikely that a decisive confrontation will occur in the immediate future. The government, for its part, is seeking to keep the initiative while carrying on a balancing act and putting the brake on actions from below that it considers to be dangerous from its point of view. As for the bourgeoisie, it is provoking multiple tensions both to create difficulties for the Popular Unity and to make it modify its course more (it knows from experience that reactions of this kind are typical of reformists and centrists). But it is not able to precipitate an immediate showdown, nor does it want one.
It must be remembered, first of all, that the Chilean bourgeoisie has a rather long democratic-parliamentarian tradition and that its political personalities were shaped in that school. This corresponds with the existence of a series of structures and flexible, efficacious mechanisms that make defense and counterattack genuinely possible. The solution of a "strong state," of a military coup, presupposes in any case preparations that the army itself has hardly begun. The forces that are already voicing "golpista" or fascist inclinations and who are preparing the means to carry forward such an orientation are at present completely in the minority, even if they are gaining ground. Finally — and this is the most important — the bourgeoisie and its most representative party, the Christian Democrats, are very much aware that they can hardly visualize a confrontation without having a considerable mass base. Recent events have shown that time can play into their hands thanks to the weaknesses and contradictions of the Popular Unity and the economic difficulties these have helped foster. In fact the Christian Democrats have gained or consolidated positions that are far from negligible among the peasants, have regained influence among the students, and widened their margin for maneuver, including within the working class (particularly among sectors that, misled for a long time by the blind economism of the reformists, have fallen for the bait of certain demagogic bids); and, as the events in Santiago in November and December have shown, the reactionaries are able to mobilize considerable forces in rather aggressive street demonstrations.
Nevertheless, a postponement of the decisive battles is not necessarily injurious to the cause of the working class, which needs to strengthen its positions, to organize an offensive, to face and resolve the decisive problem of arming itself. But this holds true only to the degree that every tendency to limit and to channelize the mass mobilizations, and to give priority to political operations at the top level of the bureaucratic machines and state institutions is resolutely combated; to the degree and rapidity with which economic sabotage is counteracted; to the degree that the working class feels it has no obligation to carry the burden of the economic difficulties without being able to defend itself, to intervene actively, and exercise control; and to the degree that the illusion is rejected that "moderation" and loyalty to the norms of a bourgeois constitution constitute the best way to avoid a reactionary counteroffensive and a fascist coup.
6. It is a prime necessity at this stage of strategical rearmament that the working class free itself completely from any kind of reformist ideas and parliamentary cretinism of whatever form. It must understand that Chile will not prove to be an exception.
In a country whose economic and social structures are very advanced in comparison to the average level in the neocolonial world, it is clearer than ever that the perspective of a bourgeois-democratic revolution, separated from a socialist revolution, does not have the slightest objective justification. The only possible revolution in Chile is a revolution with a socialist dynamic without any break in continuity and at a relatively rapid rate. And emancipation from imperialism — in view of the close symbiotic relation between imperialism and the national bourgeoisie — can be achieved only by the complete expropriation of the indigenous ruling class. Any ambiguity, any slurring over on this subject could have disastrous consequences, disarming the basic revolutionary forces, who need to gain a clear understanding of what they grasp intuitively and try to carry out empirically.
To believe in the idea that a revolutionary dynamic of this kind can unfold completely to a victorious outcome without breaking the political framework of the old society thanks to a "peaceful" evolution and not by breaking up the old state structure, including both the administration and the military establishment, and starting afresh is to deliberately delude oneself, to forget the lessons of the long history of the workers' movement, to be incapable of grasping the implacable logic of the situation that is developing in the country. Far from being a theoretical innovation, as claim the charlatans of all stripes and those who trample on the Marxist method out of empiricism or opportunism, the concept of a "Chilean road" is only a new version of the reformist ideology that Marxism has fought since the turn of the century and that at crucial stages has ravaged the workers' movement in other parts of the world. The essential point is that in Chile the problem of taking power has not been solved at all nor even begun to be solved. It can only be met and actually solved on the revolutionary road.
From all the preceding, it follows that any form of class collaboration with the bourgeoisie or with sectors of the bourgeoisie must be resolutely rejected. This implies that the masses in Chile must struggle to replace the coalition government of the Popular Unity with a workers and peasants government that excludes any participation by parties or groups that represent, if only indirectly, the interests of the bourgeoisie and other layers of the exploiters. This means that the revolutionary process must be deepened and stimulated by the creation of bodies of dual power, by bodies of genuine proletarian democracy formed directly in the plants, the fields, the campamientos, and schools, in which the members are elected, subject to recall at any time, and enjoy no material privileges. These bodies will represent the proletariat and the peasantry as a whole and constitute the means of mobilizing the key sectors of the masses in the revolutionary struggle for the conquest of power. The unions will remain separate and apart, continuing to play their specific role, on the basis of the widest internal democracy for all tendencies in the workers' movement and in complete independence from the government and the state.
The revolutionary Marxists are conscious of the difficulties involved in forming and extending such bodies of a soviet type; but if they are not built, one of the essential elements for the conquest of power will be lacking and the revolution in gestation can be aborted. In the battle for workers and peasants councils, the sharpest line of demarcation must be drawn between the exploiting classes and their political machines while this is coupled with an uncompromising defense of the broadest democracy for the masses and all the organizations and tendencies of the workers' movement. The defense of proletarian democracy is all the more necessary in view of the fact that the concept has become obscured after the decades of Social Democratic and Stalinist preponderance. It is an imperious practical necessity that unfortunately has not been absorbed and understood by the organizations that are struggling against the opportunistic, bureaucratized parties.
A continual, very broad, thoroughgoing mobilization of the masses is the condition sine qua non for a positive development of the revolutionary crisis in Chile. It is precisely because the reformist leaderships — which the working class and peasant masses in their great majority continue to accept — have sought to limit and channelize these mobilizations and to impose decisions taken exclusively at the governmental and parliamentary level, that the movement became weakened, opening the way for the foe to take the initiative and partially set in motion layers whose interests do not coincide in principle with those of the reaction. If this short-sighted policy is continued — still worse, if the government cracks down on sectors of the vanguard of the proletariat and the peasantry, as it has already done on certain occasions, this could strengthen tendencies toward confusion and demobilization. The conditions thus created would enormously facilitate a reactionary counterattack and a rightist coup d'etat.
7. A strategy of revolutionary struggle for power must single out several key objectives. Without pretending to provide answers to all the problems that have arisen and that will arise at different stages, the revolutionary Marxists stress the following:
(a) The poor peasants and agricultural workers cannot accept the framework of the agrarian reform set by the Frei government, that is, by a bourgeois political leadership. The transformations in the agrarian structures must include the total expulsion of the landlords and the expropriation of the capitalist entrepreneurs. The limits on holdings must be set at a level designed on the one hand to avoid forming a layer of rich peasants, dangerous to the revolution, and on the other hand to guarantee the necessary resources to peasants who want to own an individual plot. Very precise norms must be established (particularly with regard to the buying and selling of land) so as to achieve the equivalent of nationalization of the land and to block any tendency toward a new concentration of property. If the agrarian reform refrains from touching the capitalist enterprises, complete domination over the most dynamic sector of agriculture will be left in private hands and the agricultural workers will turn away from the revolutionary process. It is necessary to inscribe in the program of the workers and peasants government the expropriation of the agricultural capitalists and the formation of collective farms. The latter, thanks to their technological level, play a central role in developing the economy during the period of transition.
(b) In the domain of industry, it is necessary to reject the concept of three "areas" that reserves a sector for private capital. Such a sector, embracing the most modern and dynamic fields in the existing capitalist system, would inevitably become the nerve center of the process of accumulation and the meeting place of national and foreign capital. Through general expropriation it is necessary to break the backbone of Chilean capitalism, thereby breaking at the same time the indigenous support on which imperialist penetration depends. It goes without saying that to the degree it controls entirely and directly all the key sectors of industry and agriculture, the workers and peasants government would have no interest in breaking up small business and craft industry nor feel any urgent need to do so.
(c) The nationalization of the banking system and the establishment of a state monopoly on foreign trade must be carried out to the end. These measures are all the more necessary because of Chile's position as a semicolonial country subject to imperialist exploitation.
(d) Workers control plays a key role in a revolutionary strategy for the conquest of power. It fosters the formation of dual power, the active participation of the masses and a deepening grasp of what is genuinely at stake. Through workers control the proletariat mobilizes in a concrete way at the point of production, thus helping broader and broader layers to understand in practice the need to pose the problem of power. Any form of "participation" by the workers, subordinated in reality to the power of the bosses or of government technicians, or any form of "comanagement" must be rejected. It is necessary to demand workers control of production, exercised by democratic bodies, directly elected by the workers. The problems of workers management and self-management will not become real until after the qualitative revolutionary jump, until after the overturn of bourgeois power and the birth of proletarian power.
At the same time, workers control enables the workers to bring all aspects of job relations under surveillance. They are able to challenge the organization of work imposed by the bosses, to intervene actively in setting work rates, dividing of jobs, work breaks, etc. It also makes it possible in already nationalized industries to avoid having a technocrat simply step into the shoes of the boss or the capitalist manager. Workers control can likewise represent a school in which to learn the technical tasks of administration and management which the working class must be able to carry out after the seizure of power lest bureaucratic tendencies gain headway.
Finally workers control can serve as an instrument of struggle against the economic sabotage of the foreign and Chilean capitalists. In connection with this, general measures involving planning and control must be pushed for government adoption along with abolition of trade secrets, opening of the books, and strict control over all banking operations as well as prices, rents, etc. The flight of capital, the closing down of plants, and the hoarding of goods gives extreme urgency to these measures.
(e) The struggle for a workers and peasants government, for the conquest of power, must be conducted above all through forming and constantly mobilizing organs of proletarian democracy rising out of the masses. The building of these organs is an absolutely central task at this stage, and the very fate of the revolution hinges, in the last analysis, on how it is carried out. As a transitional slogan, it is necessary to raise against Allende's project of a single chamber parliament — which fits in with bourgeois parliamentarism — the slogan of a popular constituent assembly whose task would be to lay out new political and administrative structures. This assembly must be elected in such fashion as to assure the workers and peasants the preponderant representation to which they are entitled because of their specific social weight, thus putting an end to the fraudulent present electoral system with all its dupery.
8. The strategy and orientations outlined here would be completely abstract and not free from the danger of spontanéist deviations if two essential items were left out — the absence of which up to now has constituted the main weakness of the Chilean proletariat, that is, arming the workers and peasants and building a revolutionary party. To struggle for a correct strategy thus means struggling to arm the proletariat, and struggling to build a revolutionary party as the only means of assuring the masses conscious leadership and effectively carrying out the strategy and tactics required to win.
The experience of other countries, above all in Latin America — from the invasion of Guatemala in 1954 to Banzer's coup d'etat in Bolivia last August — has shown that the working class must consider its own self-defense as an elementary task. The lesson is written in letters of blood — the blood of workers, peasants and students. Any illusions in the "good will" of the foe must be rejected as suicidal. In view of the nature of the government and the relations between the Unidad Popular coalition and the broad majority of the masses, the task facing the workers and peasants is to arm themselves, to form political and military instruments of self-defense, to organize a genuine popular militia, to disseminate revolutionary propaganda among the soldiers. Not to begin along these lines would mean in practice depending on the "democratic loyalty" of the army and the specialized repressive bodies. It would mean incapacity to respond to the need felt by increasingly broad sectors of the masses, alerted by the events in Bolivia. Allende's proclamations, according to which the Popular Unity will meet any reactionary violence should it occur, constitute nothing but demagogic bragging, since they involve nothing practical. In place of relying on spontanéism and improvisations, the necessary instruments must be put together now to prevent the class enemy from achieving a crushing material superiority when the inevitable confrontation comes about. Against any possible misunderstanding, the revolutionary Marxists stress that it is not against Allende, but against the threats from the right, and to answer any attack from the forces of bourgeois repression, that the workers and peasants must place on the agenda the crucial problem of arming themselves.
9. In another way, Chile will not prove to be a historic exception — the capitalist system in Chile will not be overturned without the decisive intervention of a revolutionary party, the conscious vanguard of the masses. The tasks pertaining to such a party cannot be left to the Chilean Communist party to carry out. This party, bearing the stamp of a long Stalinist tradition, is the instrument of an indigenous labor bureaucracy and relatively conservative layers of the proletariat that have not been mobilizing in the current crisis with the same dynamism as the younger generation. It has maintained all its traditional concepts, not cutting in the least way the umbilical cord tying it to the Soviet bureaucracy. The tasks of the revolutionary party cannot be left to the Socialist party either. While the SP has gained a wider hearing, particularly among the younger workers, and has, in the organizations it controls, adopted positions to the left of those of the Communist party — a genuine cesspool of reformism — it does not have the structure of a combat party, it does not have solid and continuous links with the masses it influences, and is more a conglomeration of tendencies and groups than a homogeneous formation, and, in the final analysis, bears the characteristic traits of a centrist organization. In any case, it is necessary to reject any concept based, explicitly or implicitly, on the hypothesis that thanks to the dynamism of the revolutionary process and the power of the mass movement and thanks to the weakening of the bourgeoisie and its very likely continuing decomposition and a situation in which imperialism would be compelled to renounce military intervention, the proletariat can come to power even without a genuine revolutionary Leninist party. It is likewise necessary to reject the variant derived from the hypothesis that an ersatz revolutionary party might prove sufficient, that is, some kind of front in which the revolutionists assemble together, or a cartel in which different organizations of the far left join up.
The task of building a party is indubitably difficult even in an objective context that is very favorable from a number of angles. But it must absolutely be accomplished. At this stage of the class struggle in Latin America, the speed with which the revolutionary crisis in Chile develops to its outcome depends, in the final analysis, on the speed with which the party is built.
10. The tense and dramatic course of events will inevitably provoke growing differentiations among the masses and bring to maturity considerable layers of the vanguard, who will come to understand the nature of the reformist regime, the contradictions in the workers organizations, and the necessity to work out a revolutionary strategy. In fact this line of development is already becoming clearly visible.
Since his inauguration, Allende has had to face mounting pressures from the left and sometimes sweeping demonstrations. There has been a considerable growth of dissatisfied tendencies that have come into conflict with the reformist restrictions. Concrete evidence of this is to be seen on the class level in the moves made by sectors of the workers and peasants that have gone beyond the programmatic guidelines of the Popular Unity and confronted the government with accomplished facts. On the political level it is to be seen in the increasing influence of the organizations standing to the left of the Communist and Socialist parties. It is in relation to these differentiations and these objective tendencies that the problem of building the revolutionary party must be posed, and not on the absurd hope of being able to solve it through declamations and half-hearted moves.
It is not by accident that an organization like the Movimiento de la Izquierda Revolucionaria, the only one of its kind in Latin America at the moment, should arise in Chile. The MIR has considerable influence. Originating in student and petty-bourgeois circles, it has succeeded, as the demonstrations of the past period have clearly indicated, in winning authority among the peasant forces that mobilized in land occupations and among several sectors of the workers who no longer accept the lead of the reformists. It is probable that this tendency will grow in the period now opening which promises a rise in political consciousness among rather broad layers controlled up to now by the Popular Unity.
The influence of the MIR is explained by its capacity to link up with the most dynamic layers of the student movement during its initial phase, of appearing as the most consistent and effective organization of the far left in putting together a rather solid organizational framework, based on cells of professional militants, despite the ultraleft deformations that marked it for an entire period up to the spectacular turn of September 1970. At the same time the MIR knew how to capitalize on the influence wielded in Chile by the Cuban revolution since the beginning of the sixties.
The contradictions to be found in the MIR lie in its incapacity to reach an overall, rigorous definition of the problems of revolutionary strategy on a world scale, in the empiricism that often characterizes its orientations and that has led to sudden oscillations from ultraleft to opportunist positions, in its concept of the party which is far from Leninist democratic centralism, particularly in practice, and in its bureaucratic concept of relations between the party and the mass organizations. This took form in the period after September 1970 in a very clear tendency to adapt to the concepts and needs of the Popular Unity, in almost total silence with regard to international events, even those of first-rate significance (the MIR, for example, has published no analysis of the policies of Moscow and Peking), in a "verticalista" organizational practice that reserves important decisions for the top level (it is significant that no congress has been held for years), in efforts through administrative means and without consultation to impose decisions taken by the party apparatus on organizations considered to be vehicles for reaching the masses.
The consequence of this has been friction within the organization, the departure of groups of militants, particularly among the students, and the loss of important positions in the campamientos. In view of its influence, the MIR, because of the weaknesses of its orientation, bears the responsibility in large measure for the crisis in the student movement. For the past year the student movement has not been able to play a major role; instead, it has provided recruits to reactionary provocations.
The forces organized or influenced by the MIR will unquestionably play an important role in building the revolutionary party that is the condition sine qua non for the victory of the Chilean workers and peasants. But other forces that still belong to the traditional parties will participate in this. The Socialist party, because of its present composition and structure, constitutes a seedbed of militants and combative and politically conscious cadres who will have a lot to offer in the process. It must not be forgotten either that a decisive change in the relationship of forces in favor of the revolutionists also presupposes a deep differentiation among the working-class layers that still represent the main base of the Communist party.
In carrying out their elementary task of constructing a Leninist party, the revolutionary Marxists must avoid both sectarian dogmatism and opportunist adaptation, integrating themselves in the real movements and advancing their program in an audacious way as an autonomous organized force in confrontation with all the other tendencies of the left.
This involves attacking without any ambiguities or concessions the reformist nature of the regime and the forces backing it. Complete independence must be maintained with regard to the popular front coalition. Revolutionists cannot participate in such a coalition even by offering it electoral support. (Revolutionary Marxists can, in certain situations, vote for a labor candidate but not for a candidate of a front that includes petty-bourgeois and bourgeois parties.) They must, however, support progressive measures undertaken by the Allende regime and maintain a united front against the attacks of the reactionaries.
The necessary criticism of the contradictions and weaknesses of the MIR must not at all stand in the way of recognizing the important role the MIR is playing as a catalyzer at the moment or of appreciating the programmatic rectifications or advances it makes (as, for example, in the speech of Miguel Enriquez last November).
A continuous tenacious struggle must be conducted to concretize the revolutionary strategy outlined above and to advance the transitional slogans flowing from it.
11. The outcome of the crisis in Chile will be determined not only by the dynamics of the domestic situation but by powerful international forces. This must be kept in mind all the more attentively in view of the fact that the thesis of Chilean "exceptionalism" goes hand in hand with a confirmed and striking underestimation of these forces. Underlying this attitude, in reality, are extremely dangerous illusions and inveterate opportunism.
It is obvious that imperialism, if need be through its satellites, will do everything in its power to influence developments in Chile and block Santiago from becoming the capital of the second workers state in Latin America. Through its international weight and its links with the Chilean Communist party, the Soviet bureaucracy will also exercise powerful pressure. The Chinese bureaucracy has played only a completely secondary role in Chile and this will hardly change. As for Cuba, its influence takes contradictory forms. Fidel Castro's visit was symbolic in this respect. On the one hand the masses turned out in huge demonstrations to greet him and pay tribute to the Cuban revolution. On the other hand Castro's almost unconditional support of Allende and his adherence to the verbiage of the Popular Unity created obstacles to the development of understanding among the masses of the necessity to build a Leninist party and to develop a revolutionary strategy for the conquest of power.
Thus it is imperative for the revolutionists to grasp the relationship between the world situation and what is happening in Chile and to bring it out clearly. The need for an international revolutionary perspective has become more acute than ever. That is why the battle now unfolding in Chile concerns not only those who stand for revolutionary Marxism in that country but the Fourth International as a whole. In this stage, so important for Latin America, it must bring to bear its theoretical tradition, its political analyses, its experience, and its world organization. D